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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the proposition that the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations has played a vital leadership role in 
the United Nations daring periods of international crises* Although 
it is generally agreed that the Secretary-General was given a poli­
tical role by the Charter, not entrusted to the head of the League 
of Nations Secretariat, opinion is divided as to whether this poli­
tical role extends into the realm of providing direction and decisive 
action in periods of high tension and conflict.
The study provides a background of the role played by the 
League Secretaries-General, the election (or selection) process of 
the UN!s chief administrator, and the authority and duties given 
him by the Charter* A second section examines the several ways in 
which the Secretary-General is able to exert some sort of influence 
over UN activities during the crucial periods, including participa­
tion in Security Council debates and direction of UN peace-keeping 
operations* The third section consists of a detailing of the 
Secretary-Generals activities in connection with nine crisis 
situations, three in the term of each of the first three men to hold 
the office* This chapter demonstrates that the Secretary-General 
has actually given direction to UN activities during these periods 
as opposed to merely acting as an administrator and an implementing 
agent for UN decisions*
iv
THE SECHETAR3T-GENEHAL AND HIS LEADERSHIP ROLE 
IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES
INTRODUCTION
This study concerns one significant aspect of tlie political role 
played by the UN Secretary-General in the functioning of that Organi­
zation in the realm of interstate politics. More specifically, it 
deals with the proposition that the UN*s chief administrator has 
actually provided the Organization with vital leadership during periods 
of international crisis. This contention is one side of the argument 
that has grown up around the subject of the Secretary-General*s role 
in the administrative and political workings of the UN. The other side 
of the argument suggests that the Charter provisions dealing with the 
office envisioned the Secretary-General as the head of the Secretariat 
and little else. This argument continues by noting that Article 99 of 
the Charter generally acknowledged as his political duty of bringing 
before the Security Council matters he deems a threat to international 
peace and security, was meant to facilitate the continued functioning 
of the Council and not to greatly augment the powers of the Secretary- 
General. In addition, any other action he takes must be at the direction 
of one of the other principal organs of the Organization which can at any 
time cease these functions should they not meet with the approval of the 
delegating body* Farther, his appointment and reappointment by the 
Council and the Assembly places additional limits on the Secretary- 
General* s freedom of action.
The thesis of this work is that the Charter gave the Secretary-
2
3General political duties,- provided the potential for others, and that 
during periods of international crisis, the UN*s Secretaries-General 
have used the provisions as well as personal initiatives to provide the 
Organization with vital leadership* This is not to say that he has per­
formed this function in every such case to come "before the Organization, 
for his ability to do so varies according to many factors such as the 
states involved, the political environment, and his own personali-ty.
But in many cases he has played a leadership role in UN activities in 
spite of the constitutional and real limitations placed upon him* This 
is not a study simply of the Seeretary-General*s political role, which is 
assumed to exist to some degree, but of his function of initiating and 
guiding UN action during critical moments*
In investigating such a proposition, a substantial body of litera­
ture confronts the researcher* Unlike source material on League Secre­
taries-General, there are few primary sources on the UN’s chief adminis­
trator. In that the UN archives are closed at this time, heavy reliance 
must be placed on secondary sources in addition to published UN documents* 
Secondary sources might be placed in three general categories. First 
are general texts on the Secretary-General in either the traditional 
(biographical) mode, such as Arthur Bovine*s detailed study, or the 
functional mode of Leon Gordenker*s work (see bibliography)* The second 
category is that of biographies, but these are basically limited to one 
of Trygve Lie and three of Dag Hammarskjold. The third general category 
consists of articles dealing with the office, studies of individual UN 
actions, such as the Congo and Cyprus, and a number of more broadly 
oriented studies. Of greatest use among UN documents are naturally the
4official records of the Security Council and the General Assembly*
The general texts mentioned above examine the office and the men 
who have held that office in respect to the influence they have exerted 
upon the Organization, basically in political and security matters. They 
describe the many forms of this influence and how it has varied according 
to the man in power. The present study approaches the office from a 
different, narrower perspective— that of actual leadership. It is hoped 
that it, in some small way, may shed some light on this less publicized 
subject and perhaps provide an outline or direction for further detailed 
research in this area.
The work is broken into four general divisions. The first is 
designed to give background by briefly describing the roles played by 
the Secretaries—General of the League of Nations, which provided guidance 
for the UN’s founders and to the UN’s chief administrators. It also in­
cludes the nature of the appointment process of the UN Secretary-General 
as well as the duties and freedoms granted him by the Charter. The 
second division describes the four major ways in which the Secretary- 
General influences UN activity in the area of political and security 
questions, including the use of personal initiatives. Following that 
is a closer examination of nine specific crises, three under each of the 
first three Secretaries-General, which highlight their actions in an 
attempt to determine their exact role in each case. The final section 
makes some conclusions on the Secretary-General as a leader based upon 
the preceding chapters. Here an attempt is made to draw a number of 
inferences about the type of leadership each Secretary—General exhibited 
as a product of the combination of the prevalent international political
5environment and the approach taken by the Secretary-General. This 
approach is for the most part determined by his background, his per­
ception of his role as Secretary-General, and his assesment of the 
situation.
The study considers only the terms of the UN’s first three 
Secretaries-General— Trygve Lie, Dag Hammarskjold, and U Thant— and 
makes no attempt to evaluate the first two years of the office under 
Kurt Waldheim. It should also be noted here that the descriptions of 
events and actions during these crisis situations are in no way in­
tended to be biographies of the three men but only a selection of facts 
pertinent to the evaluations of the aforementioned thesis.
CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND
The Predecessors
In consideration of the exact role played by the UN Secretary- 
General in the functioning of the Organization during critical periods, 
it is important to note that his job in the realm of international 
politics is not the first of its kind in the history of organized 
inter-state relations# Some 26 years before Trygve Lie came into 
office, another relatively unknown national citizen was elected to the 
post of the chief administrator of an international civil service# It 
was Sir Eric Drummond and his successors as Secretaries-General of 
the League of Nations who laid the groundwork in a new field with 
ill-defined borders# It was they who made the first mistakes and 
it was also they who achieved successes which pointed the way toward 
the future development of the office within the United Nations# The 
founders of the United Nations, in designing the basic function of the 
new secretariat and its secretary-general, gave careful attention to 
the experiences of and roles played by the League’s three chief admin­
istrators# They also provided precedents and directions for the devel­
opment of the office of their successors in the UN. A brief examination 
of the nature of the secretary—generalship under Sir Eric Drummond, Joseph 
Avenol, and Sean Lester, therefore, seems warranted here#
The origins of the League Secretariat lay in the international 
conferences which became very numerous in the nineteenth century# These
6
conferences dealt with social and economic matters as well as with poli­
tical ones* To handle secretarial and administrative functions, each 
required a temporary staff which was usually provided hy the host state 
with some members coining from participating states* In the cases where 
the conferences were a series of meetings dealing with the same topic, 
these staffs took on a semi-permanent nature adding to their duties and 
responsibilities*
But of perhaps greater significance to later institutionalization 
of the League Secretariat was the growth of public international unions 
during this same time period. Organizations such as the Universal 
Postal Union, the International Telecommunication Union, and the Inter­
national Labour Bureau, brought increased inter-state cooperation and the 
need for permanent staffs. They kept permanent records, prepared reports, 
budgets, and gave continuity to the periodic meetings of the Unions*
These staffs also came to be more and more international in composition.*
World War I brought about a total breakdown in global politics and 
the normal relations between states and it also brought about the deter­
mination to create an international organization that would institution­
alize the contacts among states and prevent future wars. Such an organi­
zation required a permanent civil service to handle a rather formidable 
administrative function. A chief officer was also needed to organize and 
direct this international staff, A number of plans (mainly British and 
American) emerged prior to the Paris Conference laying out possible designs
*Leon Gordenker, ”The Secretary-General” in James Barros, ed*,
The United Nations; Past, Present* and Future (New Yorks Free Press,
19727rpTno*
8for the organization and which dealt with the function of the Secretariat
2and its chief officer in varying degrees of detail* A number of the 
plans, such as that of Sir Robert Cecil of January 14, 1919, envisioned 
the head of the Secretariat as a person of rather significant duties and 
initiating powers with the title of “Chancellor*11 But the Committee on 
the league of Nations at the Peace Conference gave little attention to 
these plans and basically accepted the revised version of the drafting 
subcommittee# The limited role eventually given him and the change 
from Chancellor to Secretary-General reflected the difficulty in finding 
a qualified person who would accept the job envisioned by Lord Cecil and 
it also reflected the fear of some representatives of electing an inter- 
national “dictator#”
Sir Brie Drummond* The League's first Secretary-General became 
known to certain influential members of the British government as a 
result of his rapid rise through the ranks of the Foreign Office and to 
President Wilson and his adviser, Colonel House, due to his involvement 
in the planning of the League and his dedication to its success# But 
the office assumed by Sir Eric Drummond in 1919 had few guidelines and 
was given only a small number of duties by the Covenant* He was to act 
in the capacity of Secretary-General at all meetings of the Assembly and
C-
of the Countil, he was to summon a meeting of the Council at the request
2For the text and description of many of these plans see David 
Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New Yorks E. P. Putnam *s 
Sons, 1928), Vol* I and II#
^Howard B# Calderwood, “The. Higher Direction of the League Secre­
tariat,” Arnold Foundation Studies in Public Affairs, Vol* V, No# 3 
(Winter, 1937)7 PP* 3> 4#
9of any member in the case of war -or-the threat of it, and, in the event
of a dispute likely to lead to a rupture of the peace, the Secretary-
General was to “make all necessary arrangements for a full investiga-
4tion and consideration thereof#" The founders of the League described 
his duties in rather vague terms but basically envisioned the Secretary- 
General as the head of the Leagued permanent administrative staff and 
as a glorified secretary in connection with meetings of the two deli­
berative bodies# Drummond certainly did not interpret the words of the 
Covenant as giving him a politically active role and "remained true to
the tradition of the British Civil Service, of which he had been a
5member, and regarded himself primarily as an administrator#" According
to this tradition, he worked quietly and efficiently and constantly
strove throughout his fourteen years in office to keep out of the public
eye and to refrain from publicly expressing a political opinion in word
or action# Dag Hammarskjold once noted that "He [Drummond] never
addressed the Assembly of the League and in the Council *he tended to
6speak###as a secretary of a committee and not more than that#*"
The Secretary-General*s official perception of his role fit in
nicely with his personal nature# He was a man who vigorously avoided
publicity and public appearances and was described by Arthur Sweetser as
7
"a shy and modest man, terrified of speeches#"
^See Covenant of the League of Nations, Articles VI, XI, and XV#
^Georges Langrod, The International Civil Service (Leyden; A# W. 
Sythoff, 1963), p® 309*
c
Quoted in Langrod, p. 310#
^Stenhen M# Schwebel# The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p# 5®
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But these tendencies do not give an accurate picture of the actual
role played by the first Secretary-General in League activities# Drummond’s
influence can be seen in a number of areas, one of -which was his rather
significant decision as head of the Secretariat that the group should be
a truly international civil service; that is, "officials who would be
solely the servants of the League and in no way representative of or
responsible to the Government of the countries of which they were 
8nationals#” He vigorously opposed early moves to constitute the Secre­
tariat as a group of representatives from a select number of member states 
who would consult with each other in paving the way for Council and 
Assembly decisions# Later on in his tenure, he resisted attempts by 
the great powers to control the appointment of the principle officials * 
under the Secretary-General and insert the representatives in important 
posts# Drummond was less successful in preventing this action# But 
his working concept of an impartial and geographically international 
civil service was the first of its kind in inter-state politics and its 
success is evidenced in its carry-over to the United Nations Secretariat# 
Frank Walters has described Drummond’s creation as "without a doubt one
9of the most important events in the history of international politics.”
A second major example of the effects of Sir Eric Drummond’s 
influence is in the realm of political activity# Although he vehemently 
opposed public political initiatives, which would compromise his impar­
tiality, this did not preclude such activity behind the scenes# One
o
Sir Eric Drummond, "The Secretariat of the League of Nations,"
Public Administration# Vol. IX, No# II (April 193l)f.p* 229#
^F# P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London:
Oxford University Press, 19527* Vol# I, p# ?6#
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student of the office has described Drummond*s constant efforts in this
area in these words:
There was no important political issue before the League 
that escaped his attention,^gnd rarely did a problem emerge 
untouched by his influence.
Indicative of the Secretary-General rs activity that went beyond his 
administrative duties was his efforts in connection with the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931#^ His actions, which were aimed at a 
satisfactory settlement of the dispute through the League, were later 
successfully adapted to similar situations by the United Nations Secre­
taries-General. His unquestioned impartiality and well-informed knowl­
edge of the situation were his strong points as he unceasingly worked 
throughout the two-year period (up to his retirement in 1933) to 
pressure member and non-member states alike into certain courses of 
action. He was the principal communication link between the League and 
the U. S., which he felt to be essential to a quick solution to the 
greatest challenge to the authority of the League in its eleven-year 
history. Drummond helped in the drafting of resolutions which came 
before the Council in the debate of the problem. He also personally 
participated in direct negotiations with Japan in further attempts at 
a solution. As evidence of his central position in matters and of his 
influence upon member states, he sent his aide Frank Walters to Tokyo 
to pressure the Japanese government into some conciliatory gesture such 
as the acceptance of a commission of inquiry. In November 1931 the
^Arthur W. Rovine, The First Fifty Years, The Secretary-General 
in World Politics 1920-1970 (Leyden: A, W. Sythoff ,”T970)," pT""537
^For a detailed account of Drummond®s actions in this dispute, 
see Rovine, pp. 77-96.
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Japanese representative to the Council recommended such a commission
(to he known as the Lytton Commission, after its chairman), and the
acceptance of the group by China, which saw it as a delaying action,
was arranged by the Secretary-General in lengthy discussions with China*s
representative* Drummond was also important in enlisting American
support for the commission*
Although the efforts of the Secretary-General and others did not
reverse the effects of Japan*s use of force, and nor was Drummond able
to spur the Great Powers to any concrete action against the agressor,
his "part in the negotiations was more extensive than that of any
other single individual, and his recommendations and influence clearly
12not insubstantial*”
In characterizing the Secretary-General ship of Sir Eric Drummond, 
a number of points are outstanding* First, he headed a highly efficient 
and, for the most part, impartial Secretariat* He shunned public views 
and appearances for both professional and personal reasons which main­
tained his impartial reputation* This impartiality combined with his 
in-depth knowledge of problems before the League caused him to be a 
trusted source of ideas and opinions to individual member states, as 
well as a mediator in disputes between states* But Drummond* s narrow 
outlook on the public role of his office has also been criticized as 
severely limiting the development of the position in a time when it was 
still in a state of flux and without defined limits* When even the 
founding members were unsure as to the exact role of the Secretary-
^^Rovine, p* 9^ «
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General, the office could most easily have been expanded and initiatives 
taken*
However, the role played by Sir Eric Drummond must be seen in the 
perspective of the newness of the job and the League, of the political 
environment in which he functioned, and of the expectations of the League 
members. Still further perspective can be gained by noting the rather 
different role played by his successor.
Joseph Avenol. The Leaguefs second Secretary General, whose back­
ground was in many ways similar to that of Sir Eric Drummond, performed 
his duties in a radically different manner from his predecessor and in 
such a way as to demonstrate the potential of the office, but in a 
negative sense. Like Drummond, Avenol was a civil servant, spending 
nearly twenty years working at various levels in the French Treasury.
His appointment to the position of Deputy Secretary—General by Drummond 
in 1923 was based upon two criteria: his nationality, in accordance with
an understanding previously reached by the great powers providing a 
Frenchman directly below the British Secretary-General, and his estab­
lished financial and economic expertise, a valuable commodity for the 
League still facing the destructive result of World War I.
With Drummondfs resignation in 1933, he made two suggestions 
regarding his replacement: (l) that he be the national of a small power,
if possible, and (2) that in any event, it not be Joseph Avenol. He 
objected to the appointment of his deputy on the grounds that countries 
such as Germany and Italy would object to a Frenchman and personally
14
because he did not believe Avenol was suited for the job,
Although political bargains and understandings put into office the
only man objected to by the first Secretary-General, history has shown
Drummond^ evaluation of Avenol *s suitability to be correct# Raymond
Fosdick, who served as an Under Secretary-General early in the Leaguefs
history, describes Avenol in these words:
Politically and emotionally# • #he was a conservative of the 
extreme right# ##his instinct was for stability, represented 
in his mind by what he liked to believe waj^the unquestioned 
power of France# A man of limited vision#
James Barros notes how men who worked with Avenol described M m  in terms
15such as "vain,” "secretive,” and "lazy#"
Perhaps Avenolfs greatest failing in his years as Secretary-General 
was his extreme rightist leanings that corrupted the reputation of 
uncompromised impartiality that Drummond had given the office# The 
effect of this bias was to cause Avenol, both personally and in his in­
fluence upon League actions, to attempt to antagonize the fascist govern­
ments of Hitler and Mussolini as little as possible# He fully supported 
British and French policies of appeasement and when the fascist states 
withdrew from the League, he did his utmost to leave the door open for 
their return# His actions during the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia 
were typical of this tendency#^
• I  7
James Barros, Betrayal From-Within (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1969), p# 2#
^Raymond B# Fosdick, The League and the United Nations After 
Fifty Years (Newton# Connecticut: Raymond B# Fosdick, 1972), p# 49#
^Barros, pp# 20-21#
*^For a thorough description of Avenol1 s actions, see Barros, Betrayal 
From Within, Chapters 3 and 4#
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The Secretary—General personally came np with means of preventing 
Council consideration of the Italian aggression. He also formulated 
possible plans for a settlement which gave Italy virtually all it 
desired and suggested to Rome that a solution might lay in having 
Ethiopia expelled from the League. When the Council later declared Italy 
the aggressor, Avenol refused to support League sanctions against that 
state. With the Italian victory, Rome demanded the Ethiopian delegates 
be expelled and when they were not, Italy withdrew from the League.
Avenol responded by working for the expulsion of the Ethiopian delegates 
as the price for Italy*s return. Then, in September 1936, on his own 
initiative, the Secretary—General went to Rome in an attempt to talk 
Mussolini into returning to Geneva if the Ethiopian delegation were 
dismissed, but his efforts were in vain— the League *s Credentials 
Committee refused to make the sacrifice Avenol had arranged.
This is not to say that he was a total liability to his office and
to the League. It should be noted that Sir Eric Drummond presided over
the most peaceful of the League*s years and Avenol faced the growth of
totalitarian regimes in Germany, Italy, Russia, and Japan and the total
breakdown of the effectiveness of the Council and the Assembly. In the
area of economics and finance, in which Avenol had greater interest and
training, progress was made. The best example might be his work in
17establishing the Bruce Committee in 1939# The group was charged with 
the task of examining and making recommendations for the improvement 
of the League*s economic and social organization, which was functioning
^See Rovine, pp. 146-149, and Barros, pp. 194-197#
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inefficiently# Avenol suggested the creation of the committee and
selected its very capable chairman, Stanley M# Bruce of Australia# The
findings of the group closely paralleled earlier recommendations of
Avenol and provided the basis for the UN’s Economic and Social Council#
He lobbied hard to have the plan adopted by a limited Assembly in 1940
and his efforts were successful# Arthur Rovine termed the adoption of
18the new organization Avenol*s ”most significant contribution#”
In the seven years of Joseph Avenol*s tenure, numerous examples 
can be seen of the considerable influence that could be exerted by the 
Secretary-General upon League activity and upon member states individually. 
In a number of cases, he decided or was a major factor in the decision 
of what action was taken by the League# The tragedy was that in the 
political realm his personal and national interests came before the 
interests of the League and of his office and that his influence was 
used to the detriment of both# His actions in the last few months be­
fore his resignation in August 1940 were a fitting end to his career#
His resignation was in compliance with the desires of the Vichy govern­
ment of France and against his own personal wishes# During these last 
months it appears that he made an earnest attempt to completely shut 
down what remained of the Secretariat, which was at the time the only 
functioning part of the League, but it is unclear whether this action 
was his own notion or an order from Vichy# In the words of Arthur Rovine:
Joseph Avenol felt no overriding attachment to the 
League of Nations and when the Organization had reached 
the end of its usefulness, he not only abandoned it, but 
endeavored to destroy even its symbolic value to the inter­
national community# At a time of war and under pressure
^^Rovine, p# 149#
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from occupied France, Avenol’s reaction was understandable, 
but it is perhaps not asking too much of the world organi­
zation’s highest official that his first devotion be to his 
international obligations*
The lesson to be learned from Avenol*s seven years as Secretary- 
General is in the potential for influence, especially in crisis 
situations, and therefore the potential for misdirection* Some would 
claim this as justification for limiting the actions (or powers) of 
the Secretary-General* But of far greater benefit to the cause of 
world peace and to the functioning of international organization would 
be the more careful selection of the man who fills the office* The 
effects of political compromising should be minimized*
Sean Lester* To Irishman Sean Lester fell the unenviable task of
picking up the pieces of the League left by Joseph Avenol* The second
Secretary-General had dismissed or "accepted the resignations of” a
large number of Secretariat officials in the last months of his tenure
and attempted to convince the remaining League members that the war
precluded the approval of a budget by the Assembly and thus, the con-
20tinned operation of the League was impossible* Lester, who had been 
appointed Deputy Secretary—General in 1937 > had taken on a growing number 
of the Secretary-General’s duties, especially the political ones (what 
few remained) as war approached and then engulfed Europe* Avenol had 
almost totally lost interest in his office and retained control only in 
economic and financial matters*
19rbid., p. 166.
20Ibid., p. 162.
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When Avenol*s resignation became official on Angnst 31 > 19^ 0* Sean
Lester became the Acting Secretary-General of the League of Nations*
But the Organization over which he presided was a league of nations in
name only. The war obviated any meetings of the Council or of the
Assembly which effectively eliminated the League’s political functions.
In fact, Lester had to be constantly on his guard that none of the
activities of the Secretariat could be interpreted as “political."
Such activities would have been grounds for the Bern government to
demand the removal of the League from Switzerland, which was completely
21encircled by hostile forces.
Thus Lester, with the Supervisory Commission which had been es­
tablished by the Assembly in 1939, administered the remaining technical 
functions of the League. Besides the value of the League Treasurer, 
the International Labor Office, and the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, the Acting Secretary-General saw considerable merit in the 
continuation of the League in the event that the U. S., which had be­
latedly come to support its existence, desired an international organi­
zation with similar goals after the war was won. In commenting on his 
war-time years in Geneva in 1958, Lester suggested that such a desire 
by the U. S. would lead most countries to believe such an organization 
was essential, as well, with or without the U. S. He further wondered:
But could it be re-made de nouveau. Perhaps. But if 
so with much international anguish and many difficulties.
A great deal of this could be avoided if the fabric, ho^gver 
attenuated, were there; if the foundation were there...
21Ibid.. p. 180.
22Barros, Appendix, p. 268.
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Lester was able to solve the problem of the budget despite Avenol*s 
claims that a solution was not possible. A budget was drawn up and 
approved by the Supervisory Commission, which had been given complete 
authority to act in the absence of the Assembly and the Council. This 
system was used through 1945 to administer what little funds were 
available.
Perhaps the hardest part of the Acting Secretary-General * s job 
was in giving direction to the widespread sections of the Secretariat 
under the severe limitations on travel and communication imposed by the 
war. Agencies were centered in Washington, D. C.; Princeton, New Jersey; 
Montreal; London; and, of course, Geneva. Many of these groups had been 
evacuated in the early stages of the war in the event that Hitler failed 
to respect Swiss neutrality. Lester and a skeleton staff decided to 
remain at the League headquarters knowing that if Switzerland was not 
attacked, they would be isolated there until the war ended. It was the 
reasons mentioned earlier as well as a deep loyalty to the Organization 
that kept Sean Lester in Geneva.
It cannot be said that Sean Lester, who was named the League *s 
third Secretary—General retroactive to 1940 in the Assembly’s last 
session in 1946, provided any significant leadership to the League of 
Nations during his seven years as Secretary-General. The unique circum­
stances of the Second World War did not provide him an opportunity to 
do so. The Secretariat carefully served no political purposes and most 
of the technical agencies had to be administered from the other side of 
the Atlantic Ocean.
However, it seems justified to say that he offered a symbolic
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leadership for the scattered segments of the Secretariat, which was the 
League daring the war# He was a constant source of inspiration and of 
ideas that sustained the Organization through difficult times# His 
efforts made possible the transfer of the League functions to the United 
Nations, a task completed by July 1947# At that time, his office and 
the League of Nations ceased to be#
This, then was the legacy of experience handed to the founders of 
the UN and to its first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie# It was they who 
profited from two and a half decades of experiments, successes, failures, 
reorganizations, and precedents# The tenures of the League*s three 
Secretaries-General provided the foundation or the model (with alter­
ations) for the design of the office of the new Organization’s chief 
administrator# In addition, the type of role played by each afforded 
the members of the UN a lesson in the type of man needed to fill the 
office. A short examination of the appointment process under the UN 
shows that the lesson was only partially learned#
The Appointment Process
Article 97 of the UN Charter states in part that "the Secretary- 
General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommen­
dation of the Security Council#" The simplicity of this constitutional 
provision is deceiving in that it fails to reflect the controversy that 
raged over the process by which the Secretariat’s chief executive would 
be selected# This problem, as well as one over the selection and terms
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of his deputies, were the only matters of serious disagreement within
♦ 23
"the topic of the Secretariat at the San Francisco Conference*
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals suggested only that the Secretary-
General he elected by the General Assembly on recommendation of the
Security Council* But at San Francisco, the Big Four, under pressure of
the Soviet Union which favored great power control of the Secretariat,
amended the original proposal to include the election, by the Assembly
cn recommendation of the Council, of the Secretary-General and four
deputies for a term of three years. It was in this form that the
matter was considered in different committees at the Conference. The
small powers were quick to propose other means of selecting the Secretary-
General and to object to the election of his deputies* They favored
the appointment of the deputies by the chief officer and in numbers
he deemed necessary. There was also disagreement as to whether the
Council recommendation would require concurrence of the five permanent
members, a provision they favored, believing it essential that the
24Secretary-General should be acceptable to all of them.
The final committee decisions generally reflected great power 
desires by requiring the Yalta voting formula in the Council, but the 
influence of the small powers can be seen in the fact that any reference 
to the Secretary—General’s term of office or to his deputies was omitted 
from the Charter and these questions would be settled later* Another 
change was in the final wording from that of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal
^Ruth B. Russell and Jeanette E. Muther, A History of the United 
Nations Charter (Washington, D. C*: The Brookings Institution, 1958),
pV 85*47
24Ibid., p. 858.
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was that the Secretary-General would be "appointed” instead of "elected,”
which one source suggests was made to emphasize the administrative
25character of his duties*
With the constitutional framework established, one of the first tasks
facing the first General Assembly in January 1946 in London was the
election of the President of the Assembly, an event that preceded the
selection of the Secretary—General# Although the term of the President
was only one year, special attention was given to the election of the
man that would be the first to hold the position and who would be the
first indication of the type of political leadership for the new organi- 
26zation# The first choice of both the TJ. S# and Russia for the presi­
dency was Trygve Lie, a mem both countries had come to know and respect 
as a representative of the Norwegian government# He had been Foreign 
Minister of that country’s government-in-exile during World War II.
Lie might well have been elected had it not been for some last-minute par­
liamentary maneauvering, the result of which was that Belgian Foreign 
Minister Paul-Henri Spoak was elected the Assembly’s first President#
The selection of the Secretary-General was the next problem to be 
solved# A major difference in the political environment caused a 
significant change in the man chosen as opposed to the League’s first 
Secretary-General# In 1919 it was the major powers who made the decision 
as in 1946 but in the former case the states involved were in relative 
harmony permitting agreement upon a great power national as the chief
^Leland M. Goodrich and Evard Harnbro, Charter of the United Nations 
(Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1946), p# 2^ 9.
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Leon Gordenker, The UN Secretary—General and the Maintenance of 
Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 196?), p. 3^7
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administrator* But the early effects of Cold War distrust facilitated
no such concurrence* To be sure, nationals' of the superpowers and their
27allies were considered for the post, but neither would accept candidates
clearly in the other’s camp* This left the need to compromise on the
citizen of a small power and again Trygve Lie’s name came to the fore
and was acceptable to both the U* S. and Russia* He was therefore
nominated by the Council on January 29 and dutifully appointed by the
28Assembly on February 1. This system had the result of selecting a 
man who, initially at least, had the support or acquiesence of the major 
powers but it did have the Inherent danger of not necessarily selecting 
the best man for the job.
It is difficult to know exactly what reasoning lay behind the final 
agreement on the Norwegian Foreign Minister with regard to his future 
role in UN activities* As will be discussed later, the Charter provisions 
clearly designed the office of the Secretary-General to be more political 
than its predecessor in the League had been* Yet at the same time the 
job, like the Organization, was brand new and despite the similarities 
to the League’s chief administrator, the first man to occupy the office 
would likely move cautiously at first* In the choice of Trygve Lie it 
would appear the Council selected a man who would naturally play a more 
political role—-he was a national of a small state but had spent years 
as a labor lawyer and then as his country’s Foreign Minister. He was
^Including names such as Dwight D. Eisenhower, Sir Anthony Eden, 
Lester Pearson of Canada, Stanoje Siinic of Yugoslavia, and Wineenty 
Rzymowski of Poland.
28 /Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1954), PP* 416—17*
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therefore a man versed in the art of politics and no stranger to the
world of international diplomacy* On the other hand, he was not the
first choice of the superpowers for Secretary-General hut was one of
the few men hoth could agree on*
More can be learned by the experience of the selection process as
it progressed over the years* The sequence of events that surrounded
the extension of Liefs term in 1950 clearly demonstrated the political
29nature of his office* As the end of his five-year term neared, he 
appeared to be the favorite of all the major powers (including Russia) 
to succeed himself* But with the outbreak of the Korean War and his 
public stand against the North Koreans, the Soviet government no longer 
desired his reappointment* The sides of the battle were instantly 
drawn along Cold War lines and his reappointment became the symbol of 
the public endorsement or condemnation of the UN reaction to the in­
vasion of the Republic of Korea* When the Soviet Union used its veto 
in the Council to prevent Lie’s nomination and the US threatened to 
use its first veto against any other candidate, the matter was handed 
over to the General Assembly which approved the extension of his term 
of three years by a majority of nine to one*
The Secretary-General described the resulting situation in 
these terms:
***the immediate political objectives had been won: United
Nations action in Korea had been affirmed, the continuity 
of United Nations administration had been assured, and the 
independent position of the Secretary-General had been pre­
served against the threats and pressures of a great power*
29The Secretary-General provides a graphic description of the 
political battle that ensued, see Lie, pp* 367-385#
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Bat the winning of these objectives— vital as they were—  
was a heavy cost to me and my office# The immediate advantages 
to the Organization have to be weighed against the serious 
impairment in the usefulness of my office that followed#
The five members of the Soviet bloc refused to admit the existence
of Trygve Lie as Secretary-General from that point until his resignation
in 1952# Obviously, this severely limited any role he could play in
the international politics of the Cold War# It pointed up the futility
of putting into the office (or continuing in office) a man who is
opposed by one or more of the great powers, especially if one is the
Soviet Union#
In searching for a successor to Trygve Lie, the situation differed 
markedly from 1946# The evolved political potential of the office was 
evident as was the type of role played by a politically-oriented 
Secretary-General# Therefore, the permanent members were more careful 
in their selection, so careful that it took five months to find a 
suitable compromise candidate# The Russians were obviously looking for 
a quiet administrator-type and the British and the French "wanted to 
get back to the tradition established by Sir Eric Drummond at the League 
of Nations
The Americans, who knew little of Hammarskjold, compiled this
impression of him from -Americans who had had dealings with him:
##.a Swedish civil service aristocrat [formerly in the 
Foreign Office and at the time Minister of Stated , gifted 
administratively, unobtrusive rather than flamboyant, a
3°Ibid., p. 385.
Joseph P, Lash, Dag Hammar skjold. Custodian of the Brushfire 
Peace (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co#, Inc«, 196T), p# 8#
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brilliant technician, an executant rather than a political 
leader, and some feared, a compromiser rather than a 
fighter*
For the sake of progress, the U* S* was forced to accept the 
nomination of a man who appeared to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, 
and France to be a Secretary-General who would quietly reverse the 
dynamic trend of Trygve Lie*
Although he clearly failed to fulfill these expectations during his 
first term, he was generally acknowledged to be executing his many duties 
and he easily won reappointment in 1957# It was not until I960 and 
the crisis in the Congo that Hammarskj old took actions that ran counter 
to the direct interests of the Soviet Union and he, as his predecessor 
had, drew intense criticism from Moscow and demands for his resignation* 
The ferocity of the Soviet accusations surpassed even that leveled at 
Lie and only his tragic death in 1961 prevented another confrontation 
of Soviet demands and the opposing desires of the majority of the member 
states*
Although one political battle was averted, another struggle 
followed of larger proportions* No clear constitutional method existed 
for filling Hammar skj old’s place and to worsen the confusion, the Soviet 
Union continued to press for its "troika" plan, originally intended to 
replace the objectionable Secretary-General. When this plan was re­
jected, the Russian delegates attempted to have a set number of Under 
Secretaries-General established with specific geographic origins and 
with greater power vis-a-vis the Secretary-General* After numerous 
alternative plans and numerous candidates were discussed and rejected,
^2Ibid*, p* 8*
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U Thant was selected as Acting Secretary—General with no specific 
requirements in the appointing of his Under Secretaries-General. The 
soft-spoken Thant was known to both sides as Burma's permanent rep­
resentative to the UN since 1957* He had less background in foreign 
affairs than his predecessors and no experience in the democratic
politics of Europe and North America# But his selection showed the
T5growing importance of the Afro-Asian states with the Organization#
U Thant's appointment to a full term in 1962 was a result of U. S.- 
Rus si an consultations and the general recognition of his competence in 
the office after a year at the post which included his contributions in 
the Congo, the Cuban Missle Crisis, and in West New Guinea. Similarly, 
in 1966 Thant had considerable support in the Council and in the Assembly 
and to such a degree that he was persuaded to accept another term after 
previously voicing his desire to step down.3*1
The experience of the first three Secretaries-General with the 
appointment process points out that the chief administrator of the UN 
is chosen as the end product of political battles and is therefore 
judged less on his personal abilities than on his acceptability as a 
compromise among the permanent members of the Security Council# The 
process responds to the different roles played by officeholders but 
also places a limit upon them. The lesson coming from this experience 
is that if a Secretary-General is to be reappointed (or if he is to 
function effectively) he must execute the duties of his office without
^Gordenker, p# 56. 
•^Ibid., pp. 59-61.
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incurring strong opposition from any of the great powers. Two of the 
first three UN Secretaries-General were unable to do so.
The Constitutional Role of the Secretary-General
To further set the stage for an examination of the ways the Secretary- 
General influences UN activity, it would be best to delineate the exact 
duties and freedoms granted him by the Charter and the understandings 
that lay behind these provisions. They provide the constitutional basis 
for his office and it is in these articles that the actions of the 
Secretary-General must technically be founded.
The number of Charter articles that deal with the Secretariat and 
its chief administrator are very limited, describing their functions 
only in general terms. But the status of the two, as compared with 
their predecessors in the League, was altered by the new Organization’s 
founders. Article 7 of the Charter names the Secretariat as one of the 
UN’s six principal organs, whereas Article 2 of the Covenant seems to 
imply that the Secretariat is a subsidiary organ meant only to serve 
the Assembly and the Council, Chapter XV (Articles 97 through 101) of 
the Charter is concerned with the composition and function of the 
Secretariat, According to Article 97» the Secretariat shall be comprised 
of the Secretary-General (the chief administrative officer of the 
Organization) and such staff as is required, as well as the means of 
his selection as described earlier. Article 98 assigns him the duties 
of acting in his capacity as Secretary-General in the other major organs, 
of performing other duties assigned him by those organs, and of making 
an annual report to the Assembly on the work of the Organization, The
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Secretary-General is given the right to bring to the attention of the 
Security Council any matter which in his opinion is a threat to the 
maintenance of international peace and security in Article 99# Article 
100 is meant to insure the impartial, international character of the 
Secretariat and its chief executive by requiring that they neither seek 
nor receive instructions from any government or external authority and 
by stating that they will refrain from actions "which might reflect on 
the position as international officials responsible only to the Organi­
zation." In addition, member states are urged to respect this inter­
national character and not to attenqst to conq>romise it# Article 101 
deals solely with the appointment of the Secretariat staff by its chief 
officer#
For the subject of this study, Articles 98 and 99 have special 
significance* The first line of the former reads:
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in 
all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security 
Council, of the Economic and Social Council and of the 
Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions 
as are entrusted to him by these organs*
The last clause was not part of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and 
received little attention at the San Francisco Conference where it was 
added in the final version of the Charter* Its intent was probably 
to cover any unforeseen administrative duties in connection with the 
myriad of concerns of the Secretariat which the Secretary-General 
directed# Although considerable attention has been given to Article 99 
as giving him a political role, this line in Article 98 would appear 
to have had as much impact on the Seeretary-General’s role in non- 
administrative activities# One of the functions entrusted to the
Secretary-General has been mediatory roles such as Hammar skj old’s 
flight to Peking in 1954; and his trip to the Middle East in 1956# 
Another such function was the organization and direction of peace­
keeping operations as in the Middle East and the Congo# The vast 
dimensions of these assignments will be described later# Often the 
wording of the authorizing resolutions from the Council or the Assembly 
in these highly sensitive situations has been purposely vague giving 
the Secretary-General wide latitudes but also putting him in very dan­
gerous circumstances in which any action was opposed by one or more of 
the great powers# He has also been entrusted with missions of investi­
gations and observation as in the case of Hungary in 1956, when little 
else was possible against the actions of the Soviet Union# Missions 
under this provision of the Charter have had serious consequences for 
the Organization and for the office of the Secretary-General, as was 
the case with Hammarskj old’s conduct of the Congo operation and the 
resulting Soviet criticism# They have also peacefully ended serious 
international confrontations as exemplified by the eventual release of 
the American airmen by Peking in response to Hammarskj old’s efforts#
The obviously political nature of the right given the Secretary- 
General by Article 99 caused little controversy before its inclusion in 
the Charter# The discussion over this article was basically a consensus 
of opinion in the semi-political nature of the Secretary-General’s job# 
In the Draft Constitution for the new organization submitted to the 
major powers at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations by the U. S. Department 
of State, the "General Secretary" was the permanent chairman of the 
Council in addition to his administrative duties and he could summon a
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Council meeting in the event of a breach, or threat of a breach, of the 
35peace#
During the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks, Great Britain and China 
suggested the adoption of a clause which allowed the Secretary—General 
to bring such matters before the Council# They felt, as did State 
Department experts, that one weakness of the League was that only a 
state could bring an alleged threat before the Council and this pre­
vented the speedy consideration of the matter in some cases# The U# S#
and Russia readily agreed to the inclusion of the clause in the final
36Proposals# The provision was also accepted with little discussion by
the San Francisco Conference#
Article 99 has been invoked only once in the case of Hammar skj old’s
bringing the crisis developing in the Congo before the Council in July
I960. But it has alsb been used twice "by inq>licatlon," as Leon
37Gordenker described it, or in other words, through the threat of its 
use# These were Trygve Lie’s quick reactions to the North Korean in­
vasion of South Korea in 1950 and Hammarskj old’s opposition to the 
British and French actions against Egypt in the Suez Crisis of 1956#
In both examples, the Secretary—General clearly stated his intention 
to invoke the article to force the Couneil into its Charter obligations 
and in both cases events made the action unnecessary# The significance 
of these three episodes was that they were evidence of the Secretary- 
General taking a definite political stand# In the crisis in 1950,
^Russell and Muther, p# 371#
Ibid., p. 432.
37Gordenker, p. 143#
Lie’s stand preceded the UN effort in Korea and eventually forced him 
from office under a savage Soviet attack# In both cases under the second 
Secretary-General, Hammarskj old’s use or implied use of Article 99 was 
the initial step in the sequence of events that lead to full-scale 
peace-keeping operations which he organized and directed# In the first 
case, Hammar skj old greatly added to the prestige of the office and in 
the second, the result was almost the opposite# Thus, the use of the 
article, inplied or real, has been tied to three of the most critical 
periods in the UN’s history#
The provision of Articles 98 and 99 have had profound effects on 
the office of the Secretary-General and on the Organization itself.
But actions of the Secretary-General in connection with these articles 
do not include all of the principal ways in which he influences UN 
activity# An attempt to define and examine more closely the different 
means by which he does so is the object of the next chapter#
CHAPTER II
FORMS OF INFLUENCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
If ve accept the fact that the UN Charter has given the Secretary- 
General a political as well as an administrative role which makes him 
more of an actor in international relations than was the League Secre­
tary-General, this is still little evidence that he provides the Organi­
zation with a source of leadership# The words of the Charter surely do 
not imply such a function in the few paragraphs devoted to the Secretariat 
and its head#
It would seem, however, that a person who acts as the chief executive 
of an international bureaucracy of more than 5*000 civil servants, who 
is the executive secretary for all of the principal organs of the UN, and 
who is in daily contact with high-ranking representatives (and at times 
governmental leaders) of numerous member states must have influence 
beyond the constitutional provisions# Actually, a considerable number 
of ways exists for the Secretary-General to exert influence in the func­
tioning of the Organization, including his ceremonial post of UN repre­
sentative, the submission of the Annual Report# and the preparation of 
the annual budget# For the purpose of this study, however, the focus 
will be upon four basic ways in which the Secretary-General plays an 
influential role in periods of international crisis# These are (l) par­
ticipation in Security Council and General Assembly debates, (2) personal 
missions under the direction of the Council and the Assembly, (3) direction
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of UN observer groups and peace-keeping forces, and (4) personal ini­
tiatives taken by the three men# Although their participation in Council 
and Assembly debates were ordinarily personal initiatives on the part of 
the Secretaries-General and could be placed within the last category, 
they were of such special significance that they will be considered 
separately#
Taking part in debates of the two deliberative organs was a means 
used by each of the Secretaries-General, in varying degrees, to voice 
personal opinions, to provide legal or constitutional opinions, or to 
suggest courses of action in dealing with a specific problem# This 
participation was in the form of speeches before the organs and written 
communications to them while debates were in progress# It is extremely 
difficult to measure the exact degree to which states or their UN dele­
gates were influenced by these acts on the part of the Secretariat’s 
chief executive, but the reaction to them on a number of occasions 
indicates that their impact was indeed felt#
This tendency can easily be seen in the tenure of Trygve Lie# The 
first Secretary-General drew considerable notice by taking firm stands 
on political issues which many saw as deviating from the neutral path 
to be taken by the holder of that office# Although accused of favoring 
the position of the "West" or the "East” in Cold War issues that con­
tinually plagued the Organization, Lie believed he was looking out for 
the best interests of the United Nations# Such a case came early in 
the UN’s history with the problem of Russian troops in Iran in 1946#
The details of the crisis are described in the next chapter, but suffice 
it to say that the Secretary-General submitted a memorandum to the
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President of the Council which gave a legal opinion supporting the position 
taken by the Russian delegate* This action was meant to set the legal 
facts straight and perhaps keep the Council from setting a precedent 
it might later regret* To the Western states on the Council the Secre­
tary-General was over-stepping his authority.^ The end result, in terms 
of the Secretary-General^ efforts was that although his opinion was 
not accepted by the Council majority, he was granted additional author­
ity to intervene in Council and Assembly debates*
Trygve Lie clearly came out in favor of the TIN* s partition plan for 
Palestine in 1947 and tried to goad the Council into taking action to 
implement the plan in a speech to the Palestine Commission that was 
obviously directed at the members of the Council* ’But, as in the 
Iranian case, his efforts produced no concrete results and no UN force 
was established as he hoped*
In the case of the outbreak of the Korean War, the Secretaiy- 
General*s intervention in the workings of the Security Council proved 
to be fatal to his career. When he learned of the North Korean invasion, 
he prepared to call a special meeting of the Council under the authority 
granted him by Article 99* but the U. S. delegate called for the meeting 
first while Lie waited to receive a report from the UN Commission in Korea* 
The Secretary-General did, however, speak first at the Council session
at which time he labeled North Korea the aggressor and called for Security
2Council action to restore the peace* It was this stand that brought 
^Lie, pp* 74-88.
^Security Council Official Records (SCOR), Fifth Year, 473rd Meeting, 
June 25, 1950.
35
dawn the anger and criticism of the Soviet Union that eventually caused 
him to resign.
Lie’s successor, Dag Hammarskj old, also addressed meetings of the 
Council and the Assembly in some of the stormiest periods of the Organi­
zation’s history, Whereas Lie made greater use of written opinions, 
Hammarskj old preferred speaking directly to the delegates who must make 
the final decision on the course of action to be taken. His first speech 
in a crisis situation was in connection with the Suez Crisis and the 
Franco-British plan to invade Egypt with the cooperation of Israel,
Hammarskjold addressed the Security Council on October 31, 1956, and
• ••for the first time he publicly rebuked two governments, 
and two great powers at that, and served notice that there 
were situations in which he felt obliged to enter the 
political arena as an active participant.
He stated that although it was his duty to remain impartial he was bound
to serve the principles of the Charter and he expected that all member
states would honor their pledges to observe all Charter Articles, He
also expected the organs of the UN to uphold the Charter, which meant
4he expected the Council to take action to halt the invasion of Egypt,
Four days later he spoke in the same chamber in regard to the brutal 
suppression of the Hungarian Revolution by Soviet forces. In two sen­
tences he declared that the statement he made in reference to the Suez
5Crisis applied equally well in this case. He was indirectly condemning 
the Soviet Union and urging action by the Council,
^Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold (New Yorks Alfred A, Knopf, 1972), 
p, 174,
^SCOR, 11th Year, 751st Meeting, October 31# 1956.
^SCOR, 11th Year, 754th Meeting, November 4, 1956.
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Dag Hammarskj old took part in the debate in the Council session
-which established the observer group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958# His
comments gave quick meaning to the plan and the guarantee of its imple—
6mentation* But by far, the Secretary-General1s most significant parti­
cipation in such debates was in July I960, With the outbreak of civil 
war in the Congo which threatened to involve one or both of the superpowers, 
Hammarskj old invoked Article 99 to bring the matter before the Security 
Council on July 13 • In addressing that body, the Secretary-General made
his case for a military force to be sent to the Congo and outlined the
7
form the force would take, if approved. The resolution adopted early 
the next morning closely followed Hammar skj old's recommendations.
Evidently, his efforts had influenced the actions of the Council,
The UN’s third Secretary-General, U Thant, continued this pattern of 
personally addressing the Council and the Assembly, although on fewer 
occasions and in a more reserved manner thctn his predecessor, Reminis­
cent of Hammarskjold’s address to the Council during the Suez Crisis,
Thant urged the Council to take action to deal with the threat to peace 
posed by the superpower confrontation over Russian missies in Cuba in
October 1962, His communication further implied disapproval of the
8American blockade of the island.
The flare-up of violence between India and Pakistan in Kashmir in 
August 1965 prompted the Secretary-General to make more concrete 
suggestions to the Council, On September 6 he suggested an order for a
6SC0R, 13th Year, 825th Meeting, June 11, 1958."
7SC0R, 15th Year, 873rd Meeting, July 13, I960.
^Rovine, p. 370,
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cease-fire with the threat of economic sanctions to put more force behind
the order. The resolution passed called for the cease-fire but without
9
any mention of sanctions. The resolution also started the Secretary- 
General on a trip to the troubled area to attempt to bring peace.
Communications between the Secretaries-General and the Council and 
the Assembly, both verbal and written, met with varying degrees of 
success. In some cases, the proffered opinion was politely ignored by 
all of the members while at other times, as in Hammar skj old’s plan for 
the Congo operation, the Secretary-General seemed to determine the policy 
adopted by the United Nations, There were also cases between the two 
extremes such as in the Korean example in which Lie’s opinion may have 
at least legitimized activity already taking place.
The second category of influence exerted by the UN’s chief adminis­
trator is one that entailed less initiative on his part but had greater 
potential for controlling the Organization’s response to critical 
situations. The Secretary-General was given a number of personal missions 
by the two deliberative bodies. These were mainly for the purpose of 
conducting investigations to clarify the facts of a situation or medi­
ating between disputing parties, Trygve Lie drew only one such assign­
ment in his seven years when these two functions were usually entrusted 
to commissions which ordinarily made little progress. The Secretary- 
General was an unknown and untried commodity in the UN’s first years.
Lie’s only experience in this area was in 1952 when the General Assembly 
sent him to attempt to mediate a dispute between South Africa and the
^Rovine, p, 387#
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two states of India and Pakistan over the treatment of Indian and 
Pakistani minorities in South Africa# Not surprisingly, the Secretary- 
General made little progress in this hopeless task#***
This was not the case with Dag Hammarskj old# A number of reasons 
account for the fact that the second Secretary-General was often called 
upon for these personal missions# First, although Trygve LieTs efforts 
eventually caused him to resign in the face of constant Russian criticism, 
his tireless activity and involvement brought increased prestige and 
exposure to the office despite a poor record of success# Secondly, seven 
years of UN commissions showed their limited worth in a crisis situation, 
when one man could act more quickly and more decisively than a group of 
people# Thirdly, Hammarskj old’s considerable diplomatic skill enabled 
him to achieve a better record of success which in turn caused the 
Assembly and the Council to call upon him with greater frequency# He 
was ideally stated for many of these missions in that he was regarded 
as impartial yet was informed and held the confidence of many of the 
globe’s top statesmen#
Hammarskj old’s first major venture in this category came in the 
second year he held the office# Late in 1954, Communist China announced 
that eleven American fliers, who had been shot down in January 1953, had 
been tried and given lengthy prison sentences# At American insistence, 
the General Assembly passed a resolution instructing the Secretary- 
General to seek their release through measures he thought appropriate#**
***Mark W# Zaeher, tfThe Secretary-General and the U# N.’s Function 
of Peaceful Settlement#*’ International Organization, Vol. II, No# 4 
(Autumn, 1966), p# 731#
**General Assembly Resolution 906 (IX), December 10, 195^*
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In a manner described in the next chapter, Hammarskj old was able to 
secure the release of the airmen# His success in this potentially ex­
plosive situation was noted by the members who were quick to make further 
use of his talents#
In another instance (also detailed in the following chapter) in 
1956, it was the Security Council which called upon the Secretary-General 
to attenqpt to mediate in the Middle East as the level of violence between 
Israel and her Arab neighbors began to rise# After 26 years a final 
solution has yet to be found, but Hammarskjold was able to secure a 
temporary halt in the fighting# His efforts were soon overturned by 
the Suez Crisis, however, so he applied his skills in trying to work out 
a solution between the disputants in this conflict.
Dag Hammarskjold was also directed to make trips to troubled areas 
for the purpose of investigations which would supply the directing 
organ with the facts of troubled situations. In some instances this
was a token action taken when none other was possible# Such was the
12case in 1956 when the General Assembly passed a resolution sending
the Secretary-General to Hungary to observe first-hand the aftermath
of the Russian suppression of a popular xq>rising#
Just as Hammarskjold had been relied upon on numerous occasions to
act as mediator in international disputes, so, too, was his successor#
One example of Thant’s efforts in this field was a ten-day trip to India
13and Pakistan in September 1965 at the request of the Security Council#
*^See General Assembly Resolution 1004 (ES—II), November 4, 1956#
13See Security Council Resolution 210, September 6, 1965#
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A renewed outbreak of fighting and accusations of heavy infiltrations of 
armed troops prompted the Secretary-General1s discussion with President 
Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Shastri of India* But as in so 
many of the UN*s perennial problems, little progress toward a solution 
could be made* U Thant reported back to the Council and proceeded to 
strengthen the observer group, UNMGGIP, which had been on duty in the 
Kashmir since 1949*
Perhaps the greatest opportunity for the Secretary-General to 
influence the actions of the UN has been in the direction of observer 
.groups and peace—keeping missions. The role of military commander 
had not been for seen nor intended by the founders of the Organization* 
Article 43 was meant to provide the basis for such operations by in­
stituting a military command that would organize and direct military 
forces as requested by the Security Council. But the provisions of 
Article 43 were never put into motion and the UN was left without the 
nucleus of an international police force.
The first use of a significant number of military personnel was in 
1948. As requested by the UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte in 
Palestine, Trygve Lie arranged for uniformed personnel from the three 
states comprising the Truce Commission as well as 51 UN guards to aid 
in observing the cease-fire arranged by the Mediator. This group, the 
UN Truce Supervision Organization, eventually numbered about 750.^*
Lie worked in close cooperation with the work of the Mediator and UNTSO.
David W, Wainhouse. International Peace Observation (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 252.
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In this case, as in those to follow involving military forces under UN 
control, the Secretary-General was the only one who could quickly and 
efficiently organize the group as envisioned in the authorizing resolu­
tion* It was his task to implement the decisions made by the Council 
and the Assembly*
Dag Hammarskjold planned, organized, and directed the first armed 
force, the United Nations Emergency Force, authorization for which came 
from the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace” resolution* The 
Secretary-General was instrumental in determining the size, composition, 
and exact function of the peace-keeping force* Although the Force was 
placed under the direct command of General E* L* M. Burns of Canada, it 
was clear that overall control remained in the hands of Hammarskjold*
The crisis in Lebanon in 1958 brought about a Security Council
resolution which established the United Nations Observation Group in
Lebanon (UNOGIL)* The exact composition of the force was again left to
the Secretary-General who insisted, against the wishes of the U. S. and
15Lebanon, that the group was intended to observe and need not be armed* 
Hammarskjold organized the force and gave basic direction to its func­
tioning through some rather difficult circumstances* At one point, he 
backed a Japanese resolution in the Council which would authoi'ize the 
Secretary-General to enlarge UNOGIL to permit the withdrawal of American 
Marines* The Russian representative vetoed the resolution so Hammarskjold 
went ahead and enlarged the force without specific approval of the 
Council* This enabled the UNOGIL to adequately observe all border areas
^Bovine, p* 300*
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and thereby fulfill the mission for which it was established#*^
Clearly the most adventurous operation within this category was 
the UN force sent to the Congo# Hammarskj old's efforts in organizing 
ONUC were similar to those in UNEF# But the Congo crisis had many 
unique facets that demanded considerably more of the Secretary-General#
It was he who recommended the force to the Security Council and won its 
approval of the operation as he envisioned it# He acconplished the 
massive task of equipping ONUC within a few days and soon had it in 
place in the riot-torn African state# Hammarskjold directed the opera­
tion even more closely than UNEF in a situation whose complexity virtually 
defies description and with very little guidance from the Council which 
was soon deeply divided on ONUC's exact mission# The depth of Hammarskjold*s 
involvement was demonstrated graphically when he personally led a con­
tingent of UN troops into the rebel state of Katanga# Ultimately, the 
UN commitment to the Congo operation was about 20,000 men#
The tragic death of Dag Hammarskjold in 1961 did not, however, end 
the responsibility for the command of the operation# Acting Secretary- 
General Thant inherited the problem of continued fighting and the task 
of securing a settlement in the Congo with the other responsibilities 
of the office# Under Thant's direction, the path to a final settlement 
included a greater use of force and offensive action on the part of the 
UN forces. When progress toward a solution came to a halt with the 
continued intransigence of Tshombe in Katanga, U Thant urged a plan of 
economic and military sanctions but he found insufficient support to 
make the plan work# Finally, UN troops were forced to occupy Eliza-
l6IMd., p. 302.
17bethville and other major cities in the province to end the fighting*
A political settlement followed*
Secretary-General Thant also served a limited executive function in
the dispute that arose in 1962 between the Netherlands and Indonesia
over the territory of West Irian or West New Guinea* After armed conflict
developed from the dispute, U Thant was put in charge of the United
Nations Temporary Executive Authority which was to act as a government
for the area until transfer to Indonesian control was completed* The
General Assembly also authorized the establishment of a peace-keeping
force (the United Nations Security Force), which the Secretary-General
organized to enforce the peace* The force was needed for only a few
18months and a complete transfer of authority was made by May 1, 1963#
Besides the direction of a peace observation group in Yemen in
1962, the strengthening of the United Nations Military Observation Group
in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and creation of the personally-
authorized United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM),
which was designed to aid the efforts of UNMOGIP, Thant*s other major
effort in this category was the peace-keeping force ordered to separate
the warring factions on Cyprus in 1964* With the authorization of a
19Security Council resolution, the Secretary-General organized the United 
Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and appointed its commander as well 
as the UN Mediator, charged with trying to aid in a political settlement 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Thant closely cooperated with
17Ibid.* p* 358*
■^ W^ainhouse, pp. 414—415*
^Security Council Resolution 186, March 4, 1964,
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successive UNTTCYP commanders in directing the UN troops placed in the 
middle of deep-set hatreds confined to a small area* He also defended 
the work of the force before the Council to secure extensions of the 
mandate, extensions of only a few months at a time* He also worked 
closely with the Mediator in searching for a mutual accord* Although 
a total peace between Greek and Turkish Cypriots still remains elusive 
and foreign troops are still stationed in Cyprus, open fighting has 
not occurred in years and some economic and social progress has taken 
place there*^
The last major category of actions that influenced UN activity is 
that of personal initiatives taken by the Seeretar;ies-General* The term 
“personal initiatives” encompasses a large variety of written opinions, 
political stands, mediatory attempts, and investigations* The efforts 
were made without specific approval of either the Council or the Assembly 
and were often direct attempts to steer the deliberative bodies to a 
selected course of action* The record of success in the ventures varies 
greatly, according to the man, the boldness of the move, and the environ­
ment within which each was attempted* Generally, Trygve Lie*s record is 
the worst and Hammarskj old* s the best.
The majority of Lie®s might be described as political stands which 
tended to elicit considerable controversy* His object in each case was 
not to "take a side” but to establish the legality of a certain situation, 
but his action tended to favor the argument of one of the superpowers*
20Fosdick, pp. 153-155.
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Such was the case with the Iranian issue# His legal opinion was heartily-
supported and defended by the Soviet Union hut was seen by the U. S#
and other western states as being beyond his authority# The sides
were similarly aligned on the issue of Chinese representation which
came up in 1949# He openly supported the representation of Communist
China for a number of reasons: the Communists were in effective control
of the mainland, he saw no benefit in ignoring one-fifth of the world’s
population, and he saw it as necessary if the UN was to achieve a true 
21universality# Lie must also have been troubled by the Soviet walk-out—  
it could have been the first step in the early disintegration of the 
Organization# His opinion was poorly received by the Western states#
In the case of Korea, the sides changed# Lie saw himself as pro­
tecting the integrity and the future effectiveness of the UN by labeling 
the North Koreans as the aggressors and urging quick efforts by the 
Organization to halt the invasion# The Soviet reaction was a vicious 
line of criticism and accusations that continued until Mr# Lie left 
office two years later#
The first Secretary-General made an independent attempt at mediation 
during the Berlin Blockade in 1948# He continually tried to help the 
two sides reach a compromise but in the end, it was direct negotiation 
between the two that ended the crisis#
Virtually all of Dag Hammarskjold’s initiatives were in the realm of 
mediation. Few, if any, were completely successful, but many did achieve 
some improvement in the situation# Most were in connection with issues 
later considered and acted upon in the Security Council or in the General
2*See Lie, p# 254#
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Assembly* Prior to assignment by the Council, Hammarskjold traveled to 
the Middle East in 1956 and 1957 and bronght about a series of limited 
agreements between Israel and the surrounding Arab states.
Another example of this sort of activity involved the crisis that
developed in Laos in 1959 and I960 between the central government and
the Conmnmist-backed Pathet Lao. Knowing that any meaningful resolutions
toward a solution would be vetoed in the Security Council, Hammarskjold
made a number of trips to the troubled area without Council or Assembly
authorization. He left behind a personal representative and steered the
Laotian government toward a more neutralist position in hopes of bringing
about some measure of peace. His efforts had little success toward a
real solution but they were significant enough to draw the criticism of
22the Soviet Union*
Perhaps it could be said that, more than did Lie or U Thant, 
Haimnarskjold made extensive use of what would be termed "quiet diplo­
macy." Because of its nature, little of this form of diplomatic dis­
cussion is documented. But it is clear that he spent much time and 
energy working behind the scenes to sound out delegates for their views 
or those of their governments. Here, too, was a means of acting as 
intermediary between governments, a means of persuading and suggesting.
In this way he made advance preparations for other initiatives and 
assignments such as the large peace-keeping forces and the acceptance of 
same by the host countries. Thus, to differing degrees, Hammarskjold 
was aware of a crisis before it broke and was able to prepare for it.
j
^^Rovine, pp. 305-309•
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This is not to imply that the same system was not used hy the other 
Secretaries-General but they did not appear to be quite as successful 
in using it.
The independent efforts of U Thant can, in the main, be classified 
as'mediation'attempts. His initiatives, as was his tenure generally, 
were low-keyed and tended not to raise the controversy that, at times, 
limited the effectiveness of his two predecessors. Examples of his 
independent mediations are Cyprus and Kashmir, in both of which his 
efforts went well beyond the directives of the Council resolutions.
A third example was his attempts to provide a line of communication 
between the United States and Soviet governments in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. As was the case with Lie and Berlin, Thant was not able to aid 
in the discussion significantly and once again the problem had to be 
resolved by the superpowers themselves.
On a larger scale was Thant*s attempts from 1963 to bring about 
negotiations and a peaceful settlement to the war in Vietnam. His basic 
stand was in opposition to American involvement in the area but, unable 
to control that aspect, he worked unceasingly to bring the two sides 
together. He approached the Americans directly and often used the
Russian delegate to the UN to relay messages and proposals to Hanoi.
23But his efforts were in vain. Once again he discovered that when 
one or more of the superpowers is directly involved in a dispute, it 
is they that decide how and when a solution must be achieved.
In summary, the four major influencing activities described 
above were used to differing degrees by the three Secretaries-General,
^Ibid., pp. 401-409#
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-under a variety of circumstances, and with widely differing degrees of 
success* The states involved, the timing of the action, and the existing 
political environment were among the factors contributing to the 
Secretary-General1s success or failure in each case*
Participation in the debates of the deliberative bodies was used 
most constructively by Dag Hammarskjold in well-timed and well-con- ,
y
ceived plans for necessary UN action* Trygve Lie tended to take poli­
tical stands which often displeased one of the Cold War camps and there­
by raised considerable controversy and achieved less success* U Thant 
participated in a maimer less controversial and less political than his 
two predecessors* His efforts were more within the limits of what 
most states saw as his delegated duties*
The mediatory function of many personal missions assigned to the 
Secretaries-General was one of the more significant developments of 
the office* Although not always successful in the role of international 
mediator, the assignment itself and any success increased the prestige 
and usefulness of the office in the maintenance of international peace 
and security*
The direction of UN observer groups and peace-keeping operations 
was an important increase in the power of the Secretary-General* It 
placed him in personal control of large-scale military operations and 
often with great latitude* The results of these actions were mixed but, 
in the majority of cases, were favorable to the standing of the Secretary- 
General and his office.
The effect of personal initiatives taken by the UNfs chief officer 
was in some cases damaging to the office, as was Lie*s stand on Korea
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and in other instances they -were a determining factor in UN action, as 
in a number of cases under Hammarskjold.
What remains is to determine if the tendency of the Secretary- 
General to influence UN activity was for the most part a push behind 
such activity or actually a form of direction or guidance, in effect, 
leadership for the Organization# The purpose of the following chapter 
is to elucidate the actions of the Secretary-General in a number of 
crisis situations to aid in this determination.
CHAPTER III
EXAMPLES OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
The preceding chapter suggested the more significant ways in which 
the Secretary-General exerts influence within the United Nations during 
periods of international crisis. This chapter will more closely examine 
the activity of the Secretary-General in nine separate instances in an 
attempt'to discern the degree to which he actually played a leadership 
role. The crises to he discussed were chosen from what appeared to be 
the most crucial cases during the terms of the three Secretaries-General 
under consideration. They include crises to which one or more of the 
permanent members of the Security Council were a party and others in 
which none was directly involved. The nine cases should demonstrate 
each of the four basic means by which the Secretary-General exerts in­
fluence upon the Organization*s activities. The purpose of this chapter 
is not to provide a full explanation of each of the cases but only an 
examination of the Secretary-General*s role in each crisis situation.
Trygve Lie
As mentioned earlier, the first Secretary-General of the United 
Nations had a political background, unlike his two predecessors, and 
this factor was sure to affect the way he approached his position as 
head of the Secretariat. From the age of 16 he was involved in 
Norwegian party politics rising to the position of National Executive
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Secretary of the Lahor Party and later serving as general counsel to 
the Norwegian Trades Unions Federation. He held various cabinet posts 
in the late 1930*s and was Norway *s Foreign Minister during the war and 
up to the time of his selection to the Secretary-Generalship.
Trygve Lie’s approach to the newly-created post in 1946 was, not
surprisingly, a cautious one. Neither he nor the member states which
had put him into office knew exactly what his function would be.
Initially he saw himself as the head officer of a Secretariat designed
to serve the other principal organs, much as the League’s Secretaries-
General had seen their job. But Lie quickly perceived himself to be
more than just an administrator.* He felt it was his place to use his
high office to influence political decision-making as will be described
in the Iranian Case of 1946. He continued to develop this political
role, often with respect to his view that he was the representative
(and protector) of the Organization’s interests. This prompted his
intervention in the Security Council debate at the time of the invasion
of South Korea in 1950. Although he did not have the theoretical mind
of Hammarskjold, he did see the UN in a central position, as a uniting
and protective force which had the mission of preventing or at least
controlling international conflict. Essential to this mission was the
2minimization of Cold War confrontations.
It was this politically-oriented defender of the welfare of the 
Organization that came into office and quickly had to face the Cold 
War dispute in Iran.
^Bovine, p. 257*
^Ibid., p. 261,
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The Iranian Question. The situation that developed in March of 
1946 by the continued presence of Russian troops in Iran, contrary to 
the terms of an international treaty, was significant to the concern of 
this paper in several ways. On one hand, it was the first crisis of 
major proportions to confront the new Organization. Trygve Lie had 
been elected by the General Assembly only a few months before. The 
basic guide for the actions and reactions of the member states, of 
the Security Council, and of the Secretary-General lay in the general 
terminology of the Charter. Precedents that govern much of the 
functioning of the principal organs of the UN had not yet been estab­
lished. Potential for both good and bad with respect to the office 
of the Secretary—General existed in this fluid situation.
On the other hand, the necessity for some positive yet considered 
action from the UN was heightened by the fact that the dispute directly 
involved one of the superpowers. This condition could be crucial to 
the future of the UN. A debate or decision that went counter to the 
direct interests of the Soviet Union might bring an early death to the 
fledgling organization. The history of the League of Nations had 
taught a hard lesson concerning the non-participation of one of the 
great powers.
According to the 1942 Tripartite Treaty, Britain and Russia were 
required to withdraw from Iran the troops which they had stationed there 
during the war, within six months of the end of the hostilities, that 
is, by March 2, 1946. The British complied and withdrew but the 
Soviets remained in the province of Azerbaijan. Russian interests 
in the area included an independence movement within the province and
*5
the hopes of oil concessions in the future#
As Trygve Lie describes the events in his autobiography, on
March 18 he was approached by the Iranian ambassador for his views
concerning the ambassador*s intention of taking the matter before the
4Security Council. It appears the Iranian representative saw the 
Secretary-General as an impartial and informed source who might pro­
vide him with some guidance in dealing with the Soviet Union in the 
Council arena. Instead, the Secretary—General advised that the 
Iranian government first try direct negotiations with the Russians in
that he believed "a debate in the Security Council now would probably
5intensify rather than ease the dispute.11 Lie realized that a debate 
in the Council could prove embarrassing to the Russians. He also must 
have presumed that the Soviet Union did not see it the mission of the 
Security Council to be reprimanding one of the superpowers. Lie 
therefore tried to avert a debate that might seriously weaken the 
functioning of the Council, only a few months old.
But the Iranian ambassador had his instructions and he made a 
formal complaint to the Security Council. In a cloud of conflicting 
statements in regard to the actual status of Soviet troops in Azerbaijan 
the Council instructed Secretary-General Lie to ascertain the actual 
state of affairs. The item was deferred but not dropped from the agenda 
as the Russian delegate had requested (he had walked out of earlier 
meetings in which the question was debated).
^Ibid., p. 214.
\iie, p. 74-75.
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By April 15 the Iranian position had reversed-— the ambassador ex­
pressed confidence in Soviet claims that its troops were being evacuated 
and he withdrew his government*s complaint# This action followed 
negotiations between the disputing parties which brought about an 
agreement#6
In that both parties had settled the matter in private and Iran
had withdrawn its complaint, there seemed little reason to retain the
issue on the agenda# But the U, S. and other states insisted the item
be retained and this brought about an important initiative by the
Secretary-General#
Lie felt that further discussion of the dispute would only inflame
matters so he, with the help of his legal adviser Abraham Feller, drew
up a memorandum (in effect, a legal opinion) which he submitted to the
7President of the Council# The memorandum, which the President had 
read aloud to the Council, cited numerous Charter articles and para­
graphs under which-.' issues were debated in the Council# Since none of 
the articles seemed to apply to the Iranian case, the conclusion was
that **it may well be that there is no way in which it Jthe Council] can
8remain siezed of the matter#11
The Committee of Experts, to which the Memorandum was referred, 
voted with the same 8-3 ratio of the Security Council against the 
recommendation and the question remained on the agenda#
6Rovine, p# 214#
7
'Lie, p* 80.
^Security Council Official Records (hereafter abbreviated SCQR),
First Year, 1st Series, 33rd Meeting, April 16, 1946.
Although Lie*s opinion was not supported by the majority of the 
states involved, it was important in several respects. It marked the 
first intervention by the Secretary-General into the debate of the 
Council and in so doing necessitated some procedural clarification of 
the Connell*8 rules concerning the Secretary-General*s right to intervene. 
This clarification was handled in the Committee of Experts, to whose 
members Lie sent his chief assistants to lobby for a broad interpre­
tation of the pertinent Charter provisions* With strong Russian support, 
the final text approved by the Committee gave the Secretary-General 
even broader powers than he requested. He was authorized to intervene
at any time in Security Council debates without the invitation of the
9President, a prerequisite in the General Assembly,
It should be noted that although Secretary-General Lie was not 
able to prevent a debate of the Iran question and was not able to affect 
its deletion from the agenda, he did set an important precedent with 
his intervention and so caused a widening of the powers of his office.
The fact that he had not yet had time to gain prestige and experience 
might help to explain his lack of success in influencing the parties 
concerned to any major degree,
Palestine, The events which surrounded the partition of Palestine 
and those that followed it were many and involved. For the sake of 
brevity, only the events which concern the actions of the Secretary- 
General will be considered,
^Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General, p, 149,
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The matter itself came to the UN in 1947 when Britain, -which had 
administered the area as a League mandate since 1920, finally gave up 
in its attempts to govern Palestine, especially in the face of growing 
Arab pressure, and surrendered its authority to the Organization* The 
first reaction there was the creation of the UN Commission on Palestine 
by the General Assembly* After a study had been made, a partition plan 
was adopted with the full support of the U* S* and the Soviet Union, 
for their own reasons*
Secretary-General Lie had followed the trouble of the Palestine 
Mandate and he personally saw partition as the only solution* But more 
importantly, he supported the plan because it was the decision of the 
UN* Thus, "as Secretary-General, I took the cue and, when approached 
by delegations for advice, frankly recommended that they follow the 
majority plan* He quickly saw that the next big hurdle lay in the 
implementation of the plan in that it was soon evident that there was 
little support (from either large or small powers) for any action that 
enforced the partition plan. A five-nation Palestine Commission was 
created to oversee the administrative changeover, but nothing more*
With threats and occurrences of violence increasing between Jews and 
Arabs, Lie quietly initiated studies concerning the creation of an 
armed force under the UN flag to keep the peace* He made inquiries 
to both small powers and the five great powers about contributing 
troops to such a force* But he found little support. In an address 
to the first meeting of the UN Palestine Commission in January 1948, 
he suggested to the members of the group that the Security Council
*^Lie, p* 162.
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would "assume its full measure of responsibility in implementation
of the Assembly's resolution#"^ Lie later wrote:
I prodded the Security Council so openly, not because I was 
confident J^at it would act, but because I feared that it 
might not#
Despite the Secretary-General*s efforts, including the threat of 
his resignation, the great powers remained intransigent and no action 
was taken, with the exception of the appointment of a UN Mediator who 
was to try to negotiate a peace# Still firm in the belief that he 
should bring about the implementation of the plan, Lie sent represen­
tatives to Washington and London urging action by the Council and he
also sent a letter to each of the permanent members with the same
. . 13 purpose xn mind#
The Council finally demanded a cease-fire to be implemented by
the UN Mediator, Count FoIke Bemadotte# Arthur Rovine describes the
manner in which Lie assisted in this effort once the Council made its
decision:
The Secretariat and the Secretary—General were instru­
mental in assisting Bernadotte's mediation effort# Lie 
worked efficiently to get UN observers into the field, and 
ultimately some 730 UN personnel were stationed in the 
Middle East for purposes of observation, negotiation, truce 
supervision, and to act as a buffer between Arab and Israeli 
forces# ##Lie also provided Bemadotte with United Nations
Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds«, Public Papers of the 
Secretaries-General of the United Nations# Volume I, Trygve Lie (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 109. This volume also
contains a portion of a working paper prepared by the Secretariat 
which concerns the creation of a UN armed force, pp# 110-115#
*^Lie, p# 164#
^See Cordier and Foote, pp* 116-117 for the text of the letter#
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Secretariat guards just a |gw days after they had been 
requested by the mediator#
Lie continued to work closely -with Bemadotte in attempting to 
negotiate a lasting peace in spite of the irreconcilable differences 
between the two sides# His intense concern for the mediation efforts 
was evidenced by his quick appointment of Ralph Bunche as Mediator 
with the tragic assasination of Count Bemadotte# This unauthorized 
action was later approved by the Security Council#
Throughout the trying months, the Secretary-General*s actions drew 
considerable criticism# He was accused of overstepping his authority 
in attempting to spur the Council to action, but more often he was 
labeled as pro-Israeli and anti-Arab# His reply to both types of 
criticism was that he had acted in the interests of the United Nations#
He felt obligated to see that the General Assembly resolution was 
implemented and not ignored# He saw this as the best means of restoring 
international peace and security# Although the Secretary-General was meant 
to be a neutral party, Lie believed that he must act politically when 
the reputation and future effectiveness of the United Nations are at 
stake#
As a by-product of his actions and suggestions, Lie provided the 
groundwork for future UN actions in the Middle East and for easier 
acceptance of the peacekeeping forces during the term of Dag Hammarskjold# 
As one observer has noted, "the Palestine issue# # #constituted a major 
opportunity for the political development of the Secretary-General1s
15
office, and one grasped quickly and skillfully by Trygve Lie#"
^Siovine, p# 221#
^Ibid#, p# 224#
The Korean Crisis# The efforts of the Secretary-General and their 
impact upon the actions of the UN in connection with the outbreak of 
the Korean War differ markedly from those of the crises described above# 
In both of those cases Trygve Lie attempted to provide the new Organi­
zation with leadership or a source of direction but was, for the most 
part, unsuccessful# In one instance (Iran), he was unable to overcome 
early Cold War prejudices and in the second (Palestine), he was unable 
to exert sufficient influence to bring about the creation of a United 
Nations force that was perhaps too new or radical for the Council to 
accept in its second or third year of existence# In the case of Korea, 
however, Lie's actions had considerable inq?act and, in effect, deter­
mined how the UN would react to a given situation much of the time#
The task of unifying the Korean peninsula into a single state with 
a freely-elected democratic government was officially handed over to 
the UN in 1947# A Temporary Commission was set up to supervise elections 
throughout Korea, but it soon became evident that the Communist govern­
ment of the North would resist all efforts of the UN Commission# The 
group was able to supervise elections only in the South in May 1948#
The General Assembly then established the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) 
which was designed to observe progress toward unification and to further 
observe the changing military situation# This Commission was evidence 
of the UN's concern for the problem of a divided country and for the 
welfare of South Korea which had been established as a free and lawful 
state under UN auspices# This involvement of the Organization in Korean 
affairs helped to explain Trygve Lie's reaction to the events of 
June 1950.
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The Secretary-General was notified during the night of June 2k "by 
an official of the U. S. State Department of what appeared to he a full- 
scale invasion of the South hy North Korean forces* Lie took action 
quickly— he made preparations for the convening of an emergency session 
of the Security Council (under Article 99) and sent a cable to the 
UNCOK headquarters in Seoul for an immediate report from its observers 
along the 35th Parallel. When the report arrived the next day (prior 
to the Security Council meeting), it confirmed the North Korean in­
vasion and suggested the Secretary-^ General take the issue to the Council 
meeting. Lie described his response in these words:
I resolved to take up the Commission*s suggestion, not 
only because the United Nations organ most immediately 
involved so advised, but because this to me was clear-cut 
aggression— apparently well calculated, meticulously planned, 
and with;all' the elements of surprise which reminded me of 
the Nazi invasion of Norway— because this was aggression against 
a “creation” of the United Nations, and because the response 
of the Security Council would be more certain and more in 
the spirit of the Organization as a whole were the Secretary-* 
General to take the lead.
The Secretary-General was the first to speak at the Council meeting 
where he read a statement he had prepared with his aides Feller and 
Cordier. His historic pronouncement was in these terms:
The report received by me from the Commission, as well 
as reports from other sources in Korea, make it plain that 
military actions have been undertaken by Northern Korean 
forces. These actions are a direct violation of the Resolu­
tion of the General Assembly...as well as a violation of the 
Principles of the Charter...The Security Council is, in my 
opinion, the competent organ to deal with [the present 
situation]. I consider it the clear duty of the Security 
Council to,take steps necessary to reestablish peace in 
that area.
l6Lie, pp. 328-329.
17SC0R, 5th Year, 473rd Meeting, June 25, 1950.
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The intentions of the Secretary-General were obvious— he was 
anticipating Soviet objections and suggesting the basis for a Council 
resolution* He named the North Koreans as the aggressors and demanded 
that the Council take action against them* These were not the words 
of a chief administrator but those of an executive providing leadership 
at a crucial moment when time liras all-important* He realized that if 
the Council was to take action it must do so quickly and decisively.
His clearly partisan stand was reminscent of his "pro-Israeli" stand 
in the Palestine issue— both were based on a concern for the interests 
of the UN. He felt it to be his responsibility to see that this case 
of aggression was brought before the Council and he feared the inaction 
which had signaled the decline of the League with the Japanese invasion 
of Manchuria*
A strong resolution was drafted and passed by the Council con­
demning the North Korean action, its passage made possible by the 
absence of the Russian delegate who was boycotting Council over the 
Red Chinese representation issue.
American and South Korean forces were soon embroiled in a bloody 
conflict that was to continue for years* Trygve Lie*s efforts con­
tinued, as well# He worked tirelessly to keep the UN in the picture, 
to make a truly international force a reality* He worked to involve 
more nations in the TJN cause, and to a greater degree, he worked with 
all parties involved (including the Chinese) to negotiate an end to 
the war.18
18For a full description of his efforts see Lie, pp, 349-366, or 
Rovine, pp. 236-251*
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In the end, it was Lie’s strong stand against North Korean aggres­
sion in defense of the principles of the Charter that caused him to he 
driven from the office by the vicious personal attacks of the Soviet 
Union* Although it ultimately ended his usefulness to the UN, Trygve 
Lie provided the Organization with leadership in a time of crisis when 
its future was at stake* For him there was no choice involved*
Dag Hammarskjold
The second Secretary-General of the UN was from a family of public 
servants, .his father serving in a number of high governmental posts 
while -two--of'his brothers also had public careers* But Dag Hammarskjold 
was noted more for his intellectual achievements as a young man 
obtaining advanced degrees in philosophy, law, and economics* Through­
out the 1930*8 and 1940*s, he held a variety of offices within the 
Swedish government, mostly in technical and administrative areas*
Daring the late 1940’s he held a number of high positions within the 
Foreign Office including Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs* In 1952 
he was a member of his country’s delegation to the United Nations* As 
mentioned previously, he was most noted for his abilities as an 
economic administrator and technician*
Hammarskjold’s conception of the role of the UN and of his office 
reflect many of the intellectual experiences of his earlier life* He 
saw the UN not as a central unifying force, as had his predecessor, but 
as one of the major political actors* This resulted in his theoretical
concepts of means by which the Organization conld contribute to the
maintenance of peace* These were "quiet diplomacy,” for the behind-
the-scenes—discussion of major issues, and "preventative diplomacy,"
to react quickly to outbreaks of violence and thereby preventing its
19expansion to include the superpowers* He turned these theories into 
practice during his years in office*
Although he often justified his actions and those of the Organi­
zation legally or constitutionally, he firmly believed the Charter 
implied an independent and political role for the Secretary-General 
and took every opportunity to expand the powers of the office* He 
held that an independent Secretary-General was essential to the smooth 
running of the Organization which was itself an independent actor in 
world politics*
Dag Hammarskjold came into office at a time when the political 
effects of the Korean War had badly damaged the reputation and the 
utility of both the TJN and the Secretary-Generalship* The extreme 
displeasure of the Communist bloc with the "illegal" actions of the 
Security Council had brought the Organization to the lowest point of 
its short history*
Within a few years the UN was to be involved in its most extensive 
operation to date in the cause of international peace, that is, the 
United Nations Emergency Force* But before the Organization was able 
to take this type of role in interstate politics, there was the need 
to restore prestige and stature to the UN and to the office of its chief
19Bovine, p* 328*
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administrator. An opportunity to take a first step in that direction 
came to Dag Hammarskjold in the fall of 1954.
The U. S. Fliers Mission. On November 24, it was announced by 
Radio Peking that eleven U. S. airmen, who had been shot down some 
twenty months earlier in a B-29 assigned to the United Nations Command, 
had been tried and sentenced to lengthy prison terms as -"spies1 who had 
violated Chinese territorial air space. In addition to these crewmen, 
the Chinese held foor U. S. jet pilots who had been shot down before 
the end of the Korean War. The outrage of the American public was soon 
evident in newspaper and magazine editorials and in the U. S. Congress
20where some members called for a naval blockade of the Chinese mainland. 
Thus President Eisenhower was obliged to take some action quickly but 
he feared a hasty decision which might lead his country right into 
another war. The fact that the United States had no diplomatic relations 
with Communist China and had no desire to enter into any at that time 
made communications between the two states difficult. Therefore, if 
a solution was to be sought through negotiations rather than threats of 
force, a third party would be needed. The decision was to take the 
matter to the UN in the form of a resolution in the General Assembly 
sponsored by the sixteen nations who had fought under the UN flag in 
Korea. The resolution, finally passed December 10 after some heated 
Assembly debates, had two parts: (l) a condemnation of the trial and
sentencing of prisoners detained illegally and (2) a request of the 
Secretary-General that he attenpt to secure the release of the airmen
20Lash, p. 57.
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21"by the means most appropriate in his judgement,"
Hammarskjold, who privately took issue with the words of the
resolution which condemned the Chinese and then hoped for productive
negotiations with them, lost little time in responding to the vague
request of the Assembly, Within an hour he surprised everyone by
sending a cable to Chou En-lai which requested a chance to discuss the
22matter of the downed airmen with him in Peking at an early date. The
Chinese Premier's response came within a week in the form of two cables
received virtually at the same time# The first stated that Chou would
receive the Secretary-General in Peking to discuss pertinent questions
and the second condemned the UN's interference in the internal affairs
23of the Chinese people,
Hammarskjold and a small group of aides arrived in Peking on
January 5 oud were cordially received by Chinese officials. The
Secretary—General and Chou soon established mutual respect and
understanding which was vital in their discussions. As one source has
described it, Hammarskjold's object in their talks was
•«,essentially to make a good case for the release of the 
prisoners without calling in question the legal rights of 
the Chinese authorities or putting them on thg^defensive 
over their attitude toward the United States,
^General Assembly Official Records (hereafter abbreviated GAOR), 
Ninth Session, Resolution 906 (Tx), December 10, 195 *^
^^Richard I, Miller, Dag Hammarskjold and Crisis Diplomacy (New 
York: Oceana Publications, 19^ 1*), p# 33# For the text of the
Seeretary-General * s letter see UN Document A/2888, December 17, 195^ *
^See UN Document A/2889, December 17» 195^*
^^Urquhart, p, 105,
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Throughout the visit, the Secretary-General was careful to make 
the distinction between the Assembly resolution and their talks by not 
mentioning the former while basing his authority to conduct the latter 
in the duties given him by the Charter. Thus, he was in Peking not on 
the orders of the Assembly resolution but on his own authority to aid 
in the maintenance of international peace and security. This device 
became known as the "Peking formula."
The Secretary—General returned to New York without any written 
guarantee of the release of the prisoners but with an understanding 
that they would be freed. He knew the Chinese would need time so as 
not to appear to be giving in to American pressure. He publicly urged 
restraint and as the months passed he kept at both sides— urging
patience of the American officials and tirging the Chinese to release
. 25the prisoners#
In May the four pilots were released as were the other eleven 
crewmen early in August. Although Hammarskjold wished not to accept 
credit for the releases and the ulterior motives of the Chinese surely 
played an important role, a few facts remain, Hammarskjold^ diplomatic 
talents and astute use of the "Peking formula" permitted constructive 
talks to take place. His position as Secretary—General gave him 
international prestige while leaving him a neutral in a very tense 
situation. In addition, his ability to take some form of action as the 
representative of the United Nations in a short period of time may well 
have averted an extremely dangerous showdown between the United States 
and China. He reacted quickly when states would not or could not.
^Lash, p. 63.
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The Suez Crisis# The fragile peace in the Middle East achieved
under the 1949 Armistice Agreement had deteriorated slowly in the early
1950*8, hut the pace quickened markedly in 1956# The growing intensity
of raids between Israel and her Arab neighbors brought the threat of
a full-scale war to the troubled area* The efforts of Secretary-
General Hammarskjold, at first of his own initiative and later under
26the direction of the Security Council, in stressing the necessity of
all parties respecting the Armistice Agreement and skirting the larger
issues, enabled him to reduce the level of hostilities which in turn
27brought a relaxation of tensions* This was in April, May, and June# 
Another series of events, which began in July, was to negate what 
little progress had been made# On April 19 the XJ. S. Government 
announced it was withdrawing aid for the construction of the Aswan 
High Dam in Egypt# A week later the government of Abdul Gamal Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal#
With these actions, tensions again began to rise, numerous truce 
violations occurred, and once again war seemed imminent# Sides were 
quickly drawn, with the British and the French urging the establishment 
of an armed force to deal with the Egyptian move, and most other states 
either backing Nasser or opposing force in favor of negotiation which 
was the U# S. stand# A joint British and French letter brought the 
matter to the Security Council on September 26# Little progress was 
made there so the shift was made to private meetings of the foreign
^See U# N# Document S/3575, April 4, 1956#
^For a description of Hammarskjold^ efforts see Lash, pp# 67—79 
or Urquhart, pp# 132-158#
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ministers of Britain, France, and Egypt with the Secretary-General
through the month of October* Here, too, little agreement could be found
between the two sides*
Toward the end of October, the threat of military action by
Britain and Prance increased, possibly with Israeli cooperation* A
plan formulated by the three governments was set into motion on
October 29 with the Israeli invasion of the Sinai, An Anglo-French
ultimatum followed calling on both sides to pull back from the canal.
This was a means of providing a pretext for an invasion of the Canal
Zone by those two states when Egypt ignored the ultimatum* Efforts by
the Security Council to put a halt to the invasion met French and
British vetoes at the Council meeting on the 31st* Hammarskjold read
28a significant statement which has been described as "an important
turning point in his career; it represented a new type of leadership 
29for him.11 He spelled out his concept of the Secretary-General*s 
role in international crises, noted his willingness to invoke Article 
99, if needed, and stated his commitment to resign if the Council saw 
his duties in other terms*
The matter of the invasion of Egypt was quickly referred to the 
first Bnergency Session of the General Assembly under the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution on November 1* This all took place amid reports of 
British and French bombing raids on Egyptian targets and the closure 
of the Canal,
28SC0R, 11th Year, 751st Meeting, October 31, 1956.
2^Miller, p, 69*
The first resolution to come out of the Assembly (on November 2) 
called for a cease-fire and a troop pull-back but the resolution was 
criticized by Canadian delegate, Lester Pearson, for having no pro­
vision to enforce the cease-fire* On November 4, the Assembly passed 
a second resolution similar to the first but with a call for the 
Secretary-General to submit ”within 48 hours a plan for the setting 
up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency inter­
national United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation 
of hostilities in accordance with all terms of the aforementioned 
(November 2) Resolution*”
The events that followed the approval of this resolution are a 
tribute to the drive and desire of Dag Hammarskjold to see that the 
UN took definite action to restore peace* Within several hours he 
had a preliminary report ready* (During this same time he made a 
statement to the Security Council concerning the Russian invasion of 
Hungary.) His report called for Canadian General E. L. M* Burns, 
the UNTSO Chief of Staff, to head a United Nations Command but there 
was no stipulation about which states would contribute troops except 
that they not be any of the great powers. The report was approved, 
creating the first international peace-keeping force*
However, the approval of such a force was not sufficient to halt 
the Anglo—French invasion— the condition for a halt was the arrival 
of the force in Egypt*
During this first week Hammarskjold worked virtually without sleep 
in arranging commitment of troops, in negotiating the right to introduce
^General Assembly Resolution 998 (ES-l), November 4, 1956.
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the force with Nasser, and in pressuring the British and French to halt
their invasion* He submitted a second report to the Assembly on
November 6 which generally described the purpose of the United Nations 
31Emergency Force, This report was also approved.
By November 15, Hammarskjold had an initial contingent of 95
Norwegian and Danish troops in Egypt as evidence of the de facto
existence of UNEF. He continued his efforts, from both New York and
Egypt, to negotiate the exact functions of the force as well as in
securing the withdrawal of British and French forces. As soon as
this was accomplished (by December 27), he began the organization of
an unprecedented international salvage team to clear the Canal, The
work was done in record time— the job .-was completed in April, 1957#
He also negotiated with the Israelis in attempts to secure a complete 
32
withdrawal.
One student of the office of the Secretary-General summarized 
Hammarskjold’s efforts in these terms:
Essentially, Hammarskjold had turned the United States 
away from the impossible concept of collective security... 
and turned it forcefully toward the notion of a third party 
neutral intermediary that could serve as a buffer keeping 
hostile states apart while simultaneously insuring that 
great power intervention did not create a meaningful threat 
of world war,..Above all, Dag Hammarskjold had opened new 
vistas in the life of the United Nations and made an ^3 
enormous contribution to the development of his Office.
"^See U. N. Document A/3302, November 6, 1956. 
■^ R^ovine, p. 293#
^Ibijd., pp. 294-295#
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The Congo# Although it cannot he said that all of the members of 
the UN heartily approved of the way the Secretary-General had handled 
the operation in the Middle East, it was generally acknowledged that 
he had done a creditable job which included separating the opposing 
forces and ushering out (and then keeping out) great power intervention* 
Such was not to be the case in the Congo* Complex problems, both 
internal and external, seriously hindered the success of the operation 
and the result was a near fatal blow to the prestige and influence of 
the United Nations and to its Secretary-General.
The potential for serious problems in the Congo had not escaped 
the notice of Bag Hammarskjold who had taken a special interest in 
Africa and its wave of newly independent states. He saw the continent 
as an area that could greatly benefit from UN economic and technical 
assistance* He had seen the Congo in January I960 as part of a tour 
of Africa and his uneasiness about conditions there prompted him to 
send Ralph Bunche in May so that he might closely observe conditions 
as Independence Day (June 30) drew near.'*^
'With independence, political and social collapse followed close 
behind. Due to the complexity of how this internal crisis affected the 
UN and the role played by the Secretary-General within it, the de­
scription given here is intended as no more than a very brief summary 
of the events*
Independence meant the gradual withdrawal of the Belgian nationals 
who had provided virtually all of the Congo*s administrative organi­
zation and the officers for its army, as well. Within a week of
^^Urqukart, p. 389.
72
independence, the army staged a mutiny against its Belgian officers, 
which in turn prompted the insertion of Belgian troops, ostensibly to 
protect Belgian civilians and restore order. In fact, the troops 
supported a secessionist movement led by Moise Tshombe in the rich 
southern province of Katanga,
In consultation with Bunche, Hammarskjold deemed that the Congolese 
government could benefit from UN-supplied military advisers who would 
help stabilize the army and thereby restore law and order. But con­
ditions worsened rapidly and, acting upon Hammarskjold1 s suggestion, 
Premier Lumumba and President Kasavubu cabled the Secretary-General to 
make a formal request for military assistance needed to restore order 
and deal with the influx of Belgian troops. This was on July 13, In 
a characteristic manner, the Secretary-General took quick action to 
bring the UN into the picture. Invoking Article 99 of the Charter, he 
called for an emergency session of the Security Council for the next 
day and in preparation for it, lined up support for another inter­
national peace-keeping force. With American support and Soviet 
acquiescence, brought about by African—bloc pressure, the Council 
approved Hammarskjold’s recommendations to supply a force that would 
replace Belgian troops and aid in the restoration of law and order.
The resolution as approved authorized the Secretary-General to:
,.,take the necessary steps, in consultation with the 
Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the 
Government with such military assistance as may be necessary, 
until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with 
the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national 
security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Govern­
ment, to meet fully their tasks.
^Security Council Resolution S/4387, July 14, I960.
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The force was quickly organized and its basic guidelines laid 
down* In the mold of UNEF, ONUC, as it was known, would be entirely 
under UN command, would not interfere in internal affairs, would not 
become party to any domestic conflict, and its make-up would not in­
clude any great power forces*
Within 48 hours of the passage of the Council resolution, the
first contingents started to arrive in the Congo* At its peak, ONUC
36numbered about 20,000 men.
On July 22 the Council passed a resolution which commended the 
Secretary-General for his efforts in the creation. and deployment of 
ONUC and it also called for the withdrawal of all Belgian troops. It 
seemed that the crisis might be resolved in a short period of time.
But ahead lay a struggle that would seriously damage the reputation of 
the UN find bring the Secretary-General under Soviet criticism sur­
passing in intensity that leveled at Trygve Lie over his Korean War 
stand,
Joseph Lash claims that this state of affairs probably would not 
Jhave come about if Patrice Lumumba "had been politically more ex­
perienced, and tempermentally less volatile." He also describes him
as "a dictatorial, self-intoxicated nationalist politician" who was
37"impatient, unpredictable," and "swift in change of mood." His 
erratic behavior and changing loyalties made a consistent UN policy 
virtually impossible.
■^Rovine, p* 312.
37Lash, p. 233.
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In the months that followed and the political situation in the 
Congo worsened, Hammarskjold strove to conduct the operations within 
the guidelines he had initially laid down; that is, the UN forces 
attempted to restore law and order while not interfering in internal 
affairs, perhaps an impossible task. All parties insisted upon ONUC’s 
neutrality yet Hammarskjold was at one time or another pressured by 
Lumumba, Tshombe, Kasavubu, Col. Mobutu, the Soviet Union, the U. S., 
Belgium, and assorted African states to use the force to further their 
particular interests. And when he refused to do so, he was criticized 
by all, to varying degrees, for his handling of the operation.
In ONUC*s worst stages, it had lost U. S. support, the essential 
Afro-Asianconsensus, and demands for its complete withdrawal came 
from Russia, the Lumumba faction, and Belgium. But the Secretary- 
General remained firm believing such a withdrawal would have been 
followed by a civil war of unparalleled proportions. In this case, 
as in many others, his pleas to the Security Council for guidance went 
unanswered. He was forced to use his own judgement in these situations.
In the end, consensus returned to the Congo operations which 
permitted ONUC to carry out its mission, and in August of 1961 a 
central government under Cyrille Adoula was formed from the many 
factions. Although this did not solve all of ONUC1 s problems, it did 
limit its enemies to one— Tshombe and his continuing secessionist 
movement. It was in the midst of attempts to negotiate with Tshombe 
that Dag Hammarskjold was killed in a plane crash on September 17, 1961.
Without a doubt, the Secretary-Generalfs conduct of ONUC was not 
without its faults, perhaps the worst of which was his desire that the
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force remain purely defensive. The UN forces were thus unable to take 
controlling actions when it became necessary to do so as in dealing 
with Tshombe and his white mercenaries. In addition, Hammarskjold 
waited too late to use members of the Afro-Asian bloc as advisers in 
the direction and evaluation of the operation. This made him vulnerable
70
to charges of Western bias, which naturally damaged his "neutral11 image.
Although he made his mistakes, it should be noted that Dag Hammarskjold 
did organize and have authorized a force to deal with a situation he 
saw as a serious threat to international peace and security. He took 
action when the members of the Security Council did not and with 
unceasing efforts directed the operation with minimal guidance from 
the Council. He and his aides alone continued to work for a negotiated 
settlement without favoritism while the states concerned worked for 
their particular interests in the conflict. Hammarskjold must be 
given credit for providing the United Nations with leadership in the 
crisis when national interests dominated the actions and non—actions 
of the member states.
U Thant
U Thant provided the UN with a Secretary-General of origins and 
background different from his two predecessors. He was Burmese and 
spent much of his life as an educator and journalist in his home town 
of Pantanaw, In 1947 he held the first of a series of positions in
^ I M d , , pp. 260-261.
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the Burmese government, including Press Director and Secretary in the 
Ministry of Information. During the 1950’s he represented his govern­
ment abroad at many organizations and conferences, including the Bandung 
Conference in 1955# In 1957» he became Burma’s Permanent Representative 
at the UN and remained at that post until his appointment as Acting 
Secretary-General in 19 61.
Whereas both of his predecessors had been European and generally
reflected a Western point of view, Thant was an Asian and a Buddhist with
strong neutralist and anti-colonialist sentiments. He was acutely aware
of the economic and social problems of the less-developed states and
39was a spokesman for "Third World" interests.
Compared to Lie and Hammarskjold, Thant’s style was closer to the 
pragmatic and sometimes blunt methods of the former. Like Lie, he 
tended to delegate many technical details of administering the 
Secretariat to his subordinates. He also took political stands on a 
number of occasions and was not afraid to voice his disapproval of 
policies of the major powers, such as the American involvement in 
Vietnam. And like the first Secretary-General he saw the UN as the 
central institution in the international political process. Thant was 
sensitive to the dangerous effects of the Cold War and believed the 
UN should be used in any way possible to eliminate the awesome potential 
of the superpower rivalry.^ His actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis 
demonstrated his firm commitment to this belief.
39 ^Rovine, p. 341.
^Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General, p. 68.
The United Nations, inherited by its third Secretary-General in 
1961, was far different from the one Dag Hammarskjold confronted in 
1953# Some of the changes had come about as a result of the continuing 
problem of the Congo— Soviet and French distrust of the Organization’s 
chief executive, and the peace-keeping operations he directed and a 
general hesitancy in the governments of the great powers to conflicts 
before the Security Council. They could not be sure of how it would 
be handled. Some changes had come about more slowly such as the large 
influx of newly independent Afro-Asian states that caused a shift in 
power in the General Assembly. Gone or going was the so-called "mechan­
ical majority" enjoyed by the United States since 1946.
To the Secretary-General ship of this evolving UN came the soft- 
spoken U Thant of Burma, the Organization’s first chief civil servant 
from the Afro-Asian bloc. He was to bring a new perspective to the 
office and to the handling of international crises when a different 
approach was needed to subdue the criticism and mistrust that accom­
panied Hammarskjold’s last months in office.
The Cuban Missile Crisis. A series of events which began in 
October of 1962 lead to a direct confrontation of the two superpowers 
and thereby brought about one of the most dangerous situations to 
face mankind since the creation of the United Nations. In that month,
U. S. reconnaissance planes confirmed what had been feared by some 
high-ranking members of the national intelligence community— the 
Soviet Union was emplacing intermediate-range ballistic missiles in 
Cuba, creating a strategic threat to a large portion of the continental
From the 16th to the 20th of October, a select group of President 
Kennedy and his closest advisors, later to he referred to as the 
Executive Committee of the National Security Council, debated possible 
reactions to what was considered an intolerable situation. The alter­
natives included doing nothing other than informing the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Gromyko, of the discovery, a naval blockade of the
island, a surprise bomber attack on the missile sites, and an invasion 
41
plan. The President publicly announced the Committee's decision to 
establish the blockade or "quarantine” and, with the approval of the 
Organization of American States, it was put into effect by the morning 
of the 24th,
The U. S. representative to the ON, Adlai Stevenson, took the
matter before the Security Council on the 23rd with a draft resolution
calling for ON supervised dismantling and removal of the missiles prior
to the lifting of the quarantine. The plan was, of course, rejected
by the Cuban and Soviet delegates and the crisis worsened.
The next day, under pressure from a large number of non-aligned
Afro-Asian states to halt the frightening trend of events, Acting
Secretary-General Thant took his first action during the crisis by
sending identical letters to Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy
urging a two or three week suspension of arms shipments and of the
quarantine. He also suggested the two parties meet and attenq>t to
negotiate a solution. On that same day, he further requested the
42cooperation of the Cuban government in that task. As the group of
^Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia: J, B. Lippincott
Co,, 1966), pp, 60-63,
Foreign Policy Association, "The Cuban Crisis: A Documentary
Record,” Headline Series, No, 157 (January-February 1963), PP* 63-64,
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non-aligned states and the Acting Secretary-General realized, no con­
structive action was possible through the Council or the Assembly when 
both superpowers opposed it; thus, action by Thant was virtually the 
only way in which the United Nations could attempt to affect a solution* 
In President Kennedy * s reply to the Acting Secretary-General•s 
letter the President agreed to participate in preliminary talks but 
made no mention of Thant’s suggestion that the quarantine be lifted*
Elie Abel states that ’*the President was anything but grateful for 
this intervention* *• To acceptwould be to pull the plug on the elaborate
machinery of diplomatic and military pressure that he had just set in 
43motion*”
Khrushchev was far more receptive to Thant *s letter and declared 
his agreement with the proposal in his reply of the 25th* Arthur Rovine
describes the Chairman’s reasoning in this ways
The Soviet Union was already beginning to yield,
as word came on October 25 that a dozen Soviet vessels
had turned back, and Khrushchev needed the best face- 
saving device available* At the time, this was |^e United 
Nations, in the person of the Secretary-General*
On October 25, in an attempt to prevent an accidental confronta­
tion at sea which might preclude a peaceful settlement of the crisis, 
Thant sent second letters to both leaders proposing that U. S* vessels 
do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships 
and that Soviet ships on their way to the island be instructed to 
temporarily stay away from the interception area* Both men accepted 
the suggestions and, as in the case of Thant’s first letter, the Soviet
43Abel, p. 150.
44Rovine, p. 371.
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Chairman was happy to do so, still needing a face-saving device to 
justify concessions being made directly to President Kennedy*
Although sometimes hardening Soviet position threatened to 
further endanger the tense situation, the combination of American 
threats of bombing raids, Soviet realization of the superior American 
strategic position, and behind-the-scenes negotiations between the two 
governments brought about a solution, basically in the manner demanded 
by President Kennedy* Throughout the height of the crisis, a period 
of about five days, U Thant continued to communicate with the two 
leaders and to meet privately with their representatives in an effort 
to ameliorate the dangerous situation*
The Acting Secretary-General*s last action during the crisis was 
a personal trip to Cuba in hopes of convincing Castro of the wisdom of 
permitting UN supervision of the removal of the missiles, but the 
Premier could not be persuaded and the monitoring of the removal was 
done with U. S, reconnaissance planes and naval vessels.
In a number of ways, U Thant*s efforts in the Cuban Missile Crisis 
paralleled those of Trygve Lie during the Berlin blockade of 1948*
In neither case could it be said that their actions were instrumental 
in finding a solution to the direct confrontation of the TJ. S* and 
Russia* In the end, the terms of settlement were worked out between 
the two governments.
However, as Lie did in 1948, Thant provided a communication link be­
tween the disputants, was a source of tension-easing proposals, and, per­
haps most importantly, was a face-saving device for the Soviets* This 
last function may have actually permitted the Russians to concede
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and has, through the terms of the three Secretaries-General, come to 
he a vital part of their role as international mediator*
The Problem of Cyprus * The nature of the dispute on the island 
of Cyprus is not dissimilar to that of the Middle East in its insoluble 
quality. Since World War II, the Greek and Turkish populations had 
become more and more alienated from each other until the differences 
led to open conflict in 1963• Agreements reached between British,
Greek and Turkish representatives, and representatives of the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots in 1959 established a Cypriot constitution which 
was meant to deal with the problem of the two national groups on the 
island with the gaining of independence. The constitution made sub­
stantial guarantees to the civil rights of the Turkish minority which 
lived in a ratio of 1:4 with the Greek majority. The provisions of 
the constitution established the ratio in the House of Representatives, 
in the civil service and security forces, and in the army. The con­
stitution also made provision for a Greek president and a Turkish 
vice-president, each of whom had a veto power over certain actions of 
the House of Representatives,
In 1963, the Greek majority, under the leadership of Archbishop
Makarios, proposed amendments to the constitution that would reduce the
45
Turkish guarantees so as to enable the government to function. The 
proposals triggered an outbreak of fighting in December of 1963#
Through an arrangement made in the 1959 agreement, a joint peace-
James A, Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus (Ohio State 
University Press, 1968;, p, 30,
82
keeping force of British, Greek, and Turkish troops was established to
bring a temporary end to the fighting and a conference was set up in
London to work out a lasting peace#
Secretary-General Thant had stayed abreast of the events surrounding
the conflict and, at the request of all parties involved, sent an
observer, Lt. Gen, P. S. Gyani of India, to Cyprus, The matter was
further taken up by the Security Council in February. During these
debates Adlai Stevenson proposed a larger peace-keeping force, under
46I3N auspices, be established to augment the forces already there.
Although the idea was not immediately acceptable to President Makarios, 
he did approve of a resolution passed on March 4 which established 
such a force.
According to the words of the resolution "the conq>osition and
size of the force shall be established by the Secretary-General,"
47who was also to choose the commander of the force. It was this 
paragraph of the resolution that was objected to by the Soviet Union 
and France as it entrusted the Secretary-General with too much power. 
However, they abstained in the voting so as not to veto the entire 
resolution of which they generally approved.
The purpose of the force was to be "in the interest of preserving 
international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a 
recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the mainten­
ance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."48
^Vainhouse, p. 443*
^Security Council Resolution 186, United Nations Document S/5575>
March 4, 1964.
48T, . ,Ibid,
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In a number of ways, the resolution and the Secretary-General1 s 
response to it demonstrated a recognition of mistakes made in past 
peace-keeping forces. The resolution required the Secretary-General 
to report back to the Council periodically in order that the Council 
might maintain a firm control over the operation. The stated purpose 
implies that the force might need to take action not purely defensive 
in maintaining order. The resolution also provided for the costs 
of the force to escape the problem having states refuse to help in 
financing as the Soviet Union had done in earlier peace-keeping 
operations. The force was also authorized only for three months after 
which extensions would have to be obtained from the Counci 1-r-this was 
another means of keeping control of the mission in the Council’s hands.
Thant quickly began negotiations for contingents of troops and 
soon found that he had a difficult task. States were slow to volunteer 
forces which they themselves had to finance and offers of monetary 
contributions were also slow in coming. But through considerable 
effort on the part of the Secretary-General a force was established 
March 27.
Even before this date, Thant had appointed General Gyani as 
commander-in-chief of the force which was labeled UNFICYP.
In many cases, the Secretary-General used the precedents of UNEF
and ONUC in establishing guidelines for the operation. He negotiated
a "status of Force Agreement" with Cyprus in March which delineated
the functions and limits of UNFICYP in detail. In addition, Thant
49 .published an aide-memoire on April 11, 1964, which carefully laid
^United Nations Document S/5653* April 11, 1964.
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out the guiding principles for the force*s operations* This included 
the non-intervention clause used in UNEF and ONUC as well as the 
self-defense-only principle* The Secretary-General was thus protecting 
the operation from the types of criticism leveled at its predecessors* 
He continued to do so in months and years that followed with periodic 
reports of the activities carried out by the international force*
TJ Thant continued to remain in firm control of UNFICYP *fcich 
continues to perform the mission of separating the disputing sides and 
maintaining a relative peace in the troubled island* At the same 
time, he worked closely with the UN Mediator assigned to Cyprus in 
efforts to negotiate a lasting peace, but with little success*
The peace-keeping force in Cyprus reflects the more reserved and 
cautious attitude taken by the members of the UN toward such operations* 
They were determined to learn from the mistakes (as they saw them) of 
the past* But within this limited scope, the Secretary-General 
showed himself to be firmly in control of the day-to-day functioning 
of UNFICYP, The relative success of the operation in maintaining 
peace and order in Cyprus since 1964 would seem to attest to his 
ability in a very tense situation that defies a permanent solution*
Kashmir* The problem of Kashmir came to the Security Council 
initially in 1948 with the outbreak of hostilities between India and 
Pakistan over the disputed area* The conflict was temporarily settled 
by 1949 when both sides agreed to a cease-fire and the Security Council 
created the United Nations Military Observation Group in India and 
Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to watch over the uneasy peace*
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The year 1965 brought renewed military actions and personal 
initiatives on the part of the Secretary-General that marked the begin­
ning of his considerable involvement in the search for a permanent 
peace in Kashmir. His first actions were to twice appeal to both sides 
to abide by the cease-fire agreement of 1949 and he proposed sending
Balph Bunche as Personal Bepresentative, an idea that was poorly re-
50ceived by the disputants.
The matter was taken up by the Security Council in September
and much of that organ’s actions was based upon information supplied
51by U Thant. The Council approved a resolution which authorized the
Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to
renewed calls for a cease-fire and to strengthen UNMOGIP. He responded
by leaving on a nine—day trip to talk with Pakistan’s President Ayub
Khan and India’s Prime Minister Shastri, He was able to do little to
bring the two sides closer together and on his return reported to the
Council that a cease-fire was impossible at that time.
On September 17* the Secretary-General spoke to the Security
Council making a number of suggestions of ways with which the Council
might secure compliance with a cease-fire including the use of sanctions
and a meeting between Shastri and Khan* The Council acted upon his
52proposals and adopted a resolution demanding a cease-fire and asked 
Thant to provide the assistance needed to supervise its implementation.
^Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General, p. 198,
^UN Document S/6662, September 6, 1965.
Document S/6694, September 20, 1965.
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The Secretary-General thereupon more than doubled the size of 
UNMOGIP and, on his own initiative and financed by his emergency fund, 
created a 90-member United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission 
(UNIPOM) to patrol areas of conflict in which UNMOGIP did not operate#
This action drew criticism from the Soviet Union and France, who
53claimed he was acting without Council authorization#
When these actions failed to bring an end to the fighting, the 
Council acted upon another of Thant1s suggestions and ordered both 
governments to send envoys to meet with a representative of the 
Secretary—General to draw up a plan for troop withdrawals# But this 
attempt also met with failure, A solution was finally worked out 
between Shastri and Khan under the auspices of Soviet Premier Alexi 
Kosygin in Tashkent and a declaration was signed January 10, 1966.
A primary reason for the agreement lay in the fact that both 
sides were militarily exhausted. But it should be noted that the 
Secretary—General played a large part in the eventual cessation of 
hostilities. He took some actions of his own in trying to stop the 
fighting and more significantly, he stayed well informed of the 
changing conditions in Kashmir. This fact permitted him to give 
thorough reports to the Council and to make suggestions that were usually 
adopted by that body. He was therefore making policy and then 
carrying it out under the nominal direction of the Council. His efforts 
were not without criticism nor did they, in themselves, bring about 
a solution, but they played an essential part in making the final 
accord possible.
53Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General, p. 199*
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS
Having examined in some detail the actions of the United Nations* 
first three Secretaries-General during crisis situations, an attempt 
will be made here to draw some conclusions as to the degree to which 
the holder of the office has played a leadership role in the function­
ing of the Organization and how a number of conditions, both externaL 
and internal, have affected his ability to play this role. A short 
evaluation will'be made of the performance of each of the three men 
discussed and a final section will describe general factors‘which have 
affected past and will affect future Secretaries-General in this area.
As was noted in a previous chapter, the office of the Secretary- 
General, created by the UN's founders was obviously designed to be 
more politically oriented than was the chief administrator of the 
League. It was decided that he could, of his own initiative and 
according to his own judgement, bring matters before the Security 
Council when he deemed them to be a threat to international peace and 
security. This was meant to correct one of the League's major faults—  
inaction. To this at least slightly politicized post, the Security 
Council first appointed a man who had lead a very political career in 
the Norwegian government and who was definitely not of the same 
predilections as Sir Eric Urummond, a career civil servant.
In evaluating the performance of the first Secretary-General,
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a number of considerations are important# One is that he was the 
first# This distinction worked both for and against him# The exact 
nature of his role was unknown, so there were few established limits 
on his actions, no binding precedents, and therefore many chances to 
expand the scope of the office# This also meant that he had little 
guidance or direction in the conduct of a position more political than 
his League predecessors?# It was for him to find the limits of his 
freedom of action (which incurred the displeasure or wrath of one or 
more of the great powers) and it was for him to make the mistakes his 
successors would not#
The political environment in which Trygve Lie took office was 
already showing the effects of the Cold War# Instead of the relative 
harmony of the great powers that existed in the League Council and 
that was envisioned by the founders of the UN, the Security Council 
was immediately handicapped by ideological divisions that were to 
shift increasing amounts of responsibility upon the General Assembly, 
a larger body less able to find a consensus for decisive action and 
without the power of resolutions binding upon member states#
The divisiveness of the Cold War was quickly felt with the problem 
of Russian troops in Iran in 1945# It became a battle of wills—-Russia 
versus the U# S. and its allies. Into this ideological dispute stepped 
the Secretary-General with a legal memorandum, actually a political 
move designed to lead the members of the Security Council away from 
making a mistake that could have far—reaching effects for the UN. In 
so doing, Lie was performing what he saw to be one of his most important 
personal duties— safe-guarding the interests of the Organization# He
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attempted to point the Council in the right direction when the Western 
states (the majority opinion) were in the wrong and unable to see the 
matter objectively.
Although his view was rejected by the majority (probably due to 
his as yet limited influence and in a matter which directly involved 
both superpowers), the technical machinations that followed greatly 
expanded the Secretary-General1 s power to intervene in Council debates. 
The partition of Palestine, on the other hand, directly involved 
neither superpower and actually was supported by both. The Secretary- 
General, who was well-informed of the conditions in Palestine before 
and after the plan was adopted, fully backed the decision and when 
support for the implementation of the plan waned he again acted quickly 
to protect the interests of the Organization and the cause of peace 
in the Middle East, He felt the partition would have to be enforced 
to work and this called for a UN military force to keep the two sides 
apart. In much the same way Dag Hammarskjold organized for UNEF a 
few years later, Lie worked hard behind the scenes to secure commitments 
of troops and support for the force but in this case his efforts were
in vain. His failure can be credited to several factors including his
lack of personal influence and the boldness and unprecedented nature 
of an internationally—sponsored military force. States found it easier 
to ignore the problem and the logical answer supplied by the Secretary-
General than to take the rather large first step implied by such an
operation. Once again, Lie failed in his attempt to direct the Organi­
zation (actually the Council) to a certain course of action.
The Korean War was perhaps the best example of the political
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Trygve Lie# Eecalling the League’s inaction to German, Italian, and 
Japanese military adventurism, he spoke quickly and bluntly before the 
Council, naming the aggressor and demanding UN action# Despite the 
probable adverse reaction from a number of states to his initiative 
and the damaging effect it might have on his office, Lie did what he 
believed would ensure a positive response from the Organization# It 
seems likely that the strong American military action would have come 
about without any UN support, but the Secretary—General fs stand and 
subsequent initiatives played a major part in securing UN approval of \ 
and participation in the war effort. The negative side of his efforts 
was of course that they provoked such criticism from one of the 
superpowers and its allies that he was driven from office leaving 
the prestige of the Seeretary-Generalship at a very low point#
The first Secretary-General•s ability to provide the UN with 
leadership during crisis situations was severely hampered by the fact 
that he took political initiatives but at a time before he and his 
office had built up sufficient prestige and influence for many of 
his efforts to be fruitful# His own political background worked against 
him when many member states favored a more conservative role for the 
Organization in its early years# In addition, in many of the crises 
faced by the UN during Trygve Lie’s term the direct involvement of 
both superpowers limited the role played by the head officer of the 
Secretariat, as in Iran, in the Berlin Blockade, and in the Korean 
War#
Dag Hammarskjold also faced the Cold War divisions, but his term 
was considerably more successful with respect to his ability to make
and direct policy for the Organization# One of the main factors in 
this success was his personal style# Hammarskjold was more the intel­
lectual who provided himself and the UN with theoretical justification 
for his actions# In addition, he was more technician than politician 
which tended to make his approach to crucial situations more reserved 
and less controversial# His diplomatic skills are generally acknowledged 
to have been the best of the three officers and they enabled him to 
cope better with the complex field of international diplomacy# Another 
factor was that in few of the cases dealt with by Hammarskjold were 
both superpowers directly involved, enhancing his ability to take a 
larger part in the activities of the Organization# The order in which 
the crises came before the UN also allowed him greater freedom# The 
first was the U# S# Flier Incident which involved only one superpower# 
Hammarskjold acted almost as soon as the authorizing resolution was 
passed by the Assembly to prevent further deterioration of the situation# 
His diplomatic activities were testimony to his ingenuity and to his 
firm belief that the Charter inqplied considerable independence and 
authority to the Secretary-General to act on his own initiative in the 
maintenance of international peace and security# Thus, he evolved the 
"Peking formula" which allowed productive negotiations unhampered by 
the condemnation of China in the Assembly resolution# His skills, 
combined with the ulterior motives of the Peking government finally 
brought freedom for the fliers and considerable prestige to the 
Secretary-General«
The Suez Crisis marks the point at which Hammarskjold committed 
himself to a more managerial approach to UN activities# The super-
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power concurrence and only indirect involvement in the action facili­
tated his playing a large role# Even before the authority was given to 
him to conduct the operation he planned it, organized it, and secured 
support for it. He was giving reality to his theory of "preventative 
diplomacy." Once the plan was approved it was mostly a case of his 
making policies that were quickly approved by the Assembly. He even 
arranged the composition and financing of the unprecedented and highly 
successful Canal salvage operation. He laid down the ground rules for 
this and for future peace-keeping operations such as no great power 
troops would be included and the operation must be approved by the 
state or states on whose soil the UN force must operate.
Despite his growing ability to take executive action, Hammarskjold 
was well aware of the type of situation in which he could function in 
this manner and those in which he could not. With the Russian invasion 
of Hungary, in which the direct interests of a superpower ran counter 
to the principles of the UN, the Secretary-General proceeded carefully 
and with little hope of any success. The situation was not dissimilar 
to the Iranian case and he learned from Trygve Liefs experience. 
Hammarskjold did not try to force action against the Soviet Union, an 
effort that would probably have failed and at the same time turned 
Moscow against him.
His successes and growing reputation culminated in the UN operation 
which he brought before the Council, organized, and directed. His 
belief in preventative diplomacy, his natural desire for executive 
responsibility, and the lack of direction from the Council brought him 
to an increasing amount of personal control of the operation. The
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muddled internal conditions in the Congo, the variety of national 
interests involved, and the hope of preventing a bloody civil -war 
forced the Secretary-General to take action. But any action was sure 
to run counter to the desires of one or more of the parties concerned. 
His actions finally brought on a storm of Soviet criticism that would 
have put him in the same handicapped position as Trygve Lie in 1950 
had it not been for his tragic death. His ability to direct the course 
of the UN’s action lessened as the involvement of the superpowers 
(especially Russia) increased,
Hammarskjold* s soft-spoken successor had the personality and style 
that may have saved the Secretary-General ship. An outspoken or 
overtly political Secretary-General might have permanently crippled 
the office and the Organization itself. U Thant seemed to give the 
office a certain serenity or composure when it was badly in need of 
it. His quiet, pragmatic approach managed to put a stop to much of the 
controversy that had come about in the last few months of Hammarskjold* s 
life.
Thant*s approach helped him deal with the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
a direct confrontation of the superpowers. As had been the case with 
Lie and the Berlin Blockade, the Acting Secretary-General knew he 
could play only a limited role and therefore did his best to ease 
tensions, to provide a communication link between Moscow and Washington, 
and to provide mutually acceptable suggestions.
The operations in Cyprus and Kashmir, however, demonstrated the 
evolving and expanding role of the Secretary-General at a time when 
any action he took was suspect to the Soviet Union and France. Both
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operations were similar in some ways to UNEP and ONUC, Neither super­
power was directly involved and Thant was selected to organize the 
operations* UNFICYP was on a smaller scale than the previous peace­
keeping operations, was financed outside of the UN, and was carefully 
scrutinized by the Soviet Union* Even so, the Secretary—General 
managed to play a substantial role in the direction of the force and 
in the attempts to negotiate a permanent solution*
About a year after UNFICYP was approved, the Security Council 
gave Thant authority to create a military force for Kashmir* His 
efficient handling of the Cyprus operation, his involvement in the 
Missile Crisis, and his creditable performance in other cases, gave the 
Secretary-General greater influence among the member states and therefore 
greater freedom in the Kashmir case* His suggestions all but determined 
UN policy and the Council’s vague resolutions gave him the freedom to 
create UNIPOM on his own initiative* This action drew only token 
Soviet criticism and no real limitations were placed upon him* The 
greater degree of leadership shown by Thant during the Kashmir problem 
as opposed to the operation on Cyprus showed a growing confidence in 
his judgement and capabilities on the part of the members of the 
Council and perhaps a greater willingness on the part of the Secretary- 
General to direct UN activities during crucial periods.
During his years in office, U Thant played less of a leadership 
role than did his predecessor for a number of reasons* In his first 
few years as Secretary-General, he suffered under the handicap of 
diminished prestige, influence, and support that resulted from the 
controversy of Hammarskjold’s conduct of the Congo operation* Although
Thant felt strongly that the office of the Secretary-General was a 
valuable tool in the maintenance of international peace and security, 
compared to Hammarskj old's theory of the independent authority of the 
office, his views were more conservative. In the later years of his 
administration, an ever-enlarging Afro-Asian bloc in the Assembly caused 
a change in the attitude of the great powers toward the Organization. 
They no longer controlled majority votes in the Assembly and had to 
contend with a sometimes unpredictable group of non-aligned states.
Thus the major powers tended to handle more disagreements outside of 
the UN. A growing spirit of detente between the superpowers meant 
fewer Cold War disputes to come before the Organization. This is not 
to say that the Secretary-General was functioning in a period of 
international peace and harmony, but only that there were fewer major 
disputes.
The foregoing does seem to bear out the thesis proposed in the 
opening pages of the study. The contention that the Secretary-General 
has been no more than a slightly politicized chief administrator 
appears to have no logical justification. The Secretary-General has, 
in fact, provided the Organization with decisive leadership in a number 
of international crises. The evidence has certainly shown that he has 
not done so in every case and that his ability to direct UN activities 
has varied widely under different circumstances. But Hammarskjold's 
conduct of UNEP and the early phases of the UN operation in Congo as 
well as U Thant's efforts with the crisis in Kashmir clearly demon­
strate the degree to which the Secretary—General can decide upon and 
direct UN policy.
A few generalizations can be made here as to the conditions under 
which he has maximized his capabilities in this area. It appears that 
the Secretary-General * s power or influence increases with his time in 
office. He has the chance to become known and therefore to be consulted 
and his advice taken seriously by government representatives. Con­
fidence in his judgement and in his abilities tends to cumulate over 
time.
For his influence to be felt and for his initiatives to succeed 
he must be supported in his efforts by a majority of the medium and 
small states that make up the General Assembly. Especially in the 
last decade, these states have had a greater effect upon the actions 
and attitudes of the great powers.
In that a major part of his leadership roles has depended upon his 
ability to persuade governments to see his point of view, states must be 
receptive to his ideas and proposals. This ties in with the opinion 
held by member states of his abilities, impartiality, knowledge of the 
problem at hand, etc.
As described above, the Secretary-General's personality has had 
considerable effect upon his ability to lead. His political or non- 
political background, his willingness to serve the states, his 
intelligence, his perception of his role and that of the UN, and his 
diplomatic skill are just some of the factors which determine how he, 
as an individual, will react to a given situation. A detailed analysis 
of how the many facets of the human personality affect leadership is 
far beyond the scope of this paper but suffice it to say that there has 
been a considerable relation between the two.
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But perhaps the single most important variable in the leadership 
equation has been the degree of involvement of the superpowers. History 
has shown that the Secretary-General had the least influence in cases 
in which both superpowers were directly involved, such as the Cuban 
Missile Crisis or the Berlin Blockade. In these cases, the disputes 
were elevated beyond the influence or control of the UN and they were 
decided by the powers themselves. Here the UN and its Secretary-General 
could only hope to be of some small assistance in finding a solution.
Few cases have directly concerned only one of the superpowers, 
such as the U. S. Fliers Incident and in these instances, the Secretary- 
General has played a role if the interests of the UN, for which he 
worked, were in line with the interests of the superpower. In direct 
oppositon, his part would be a small one.
The Secretary-General has maximized his leadership role when 
neither superpower was directly party to the dispute. This circum­
stance has permitted the creation of observer groups and peace-keeping 
operations which, of necessity, entail a large executive role for him. 
Any divisions within the Council and the Assembly, whichever was the 
authorizing body, have facilitated, and in some cases forced, an 
expanding role for the Secretary-General.
It is indeed hazardous to attempt to predict future events, but 
it seems safe to say that man will continue to fight with his fellow 
man. And even if the major powers were to learn not to fight amongst 
themselves, small states will not. When small states (or factions 
within them) turn to the use of violence, the UN ha3 the task of
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halting such breaches of the peace or at least of controlling the level 
and type of violence# Stopping the small war has the rather large 
by-product- of preventing a larger one# In that these conflicts will 
continue, there will always be a need for quick, decisive leadership 
on the part of the Secretary-General if the United Nations is to 
accomplish that task#
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